The Minority Game Unpacked: Coordination and Competition in a Team-based Experiment
In minority games, players in a group must decide at each round which of two available options to choose, knowing that only subjects who picked the minority option obtain a positive reward. Previous experiments on the minority and similar congestion games have shown that players interacting repeatedly are remarkably able to coordinate efficiently, despite not conforming to Nash equilibrium behavior. We conduct an experiment on a Minority-of-three game in which each player is a team composed by three subjects. Each team can freely discuss its strategies in the game and decisions must be adopted through a majority rule. Team discussions are recorded and their content analyzed to detect evidence of strategy co-evolution between teams playing together. Our main results of group discussion analysis show no evidence supporting the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution, suggesting that individuals' non conformity to Nash at the choice data level does not derive from imperfect ability to randomize, but by players intentionally not pursuing this type of strategy. In addition, teams that are more successful tend to be more self-centered over time, paying more attention to their own past successful strategies than to the behavior of other teams. Moreover, we find evidence of mutual adaptation between players' strategies, as teams that are more sophisticated (i.e., they pay more attention to other teams' moves) tend, on average, to induce other teams to be less sophisticated and more self-centered. Our results contribute to the understanding of coordination dynamics resting on heterogeneity and co-evolution of decision rules rather than on conformity to equilibrium behavior, both at the aggregate and at the individual level.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Piazza Scaravilli, 2, and Strada Maggiore, 45, 40125 Bologna|
Phone: +39 051 209 8019 and 2600
Fax: +39 051 209 8040 and 2664
Web page: http://www.dse.unibo.it
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Costa-Gomes, Miguel & Crawford, Vincent P. & Broseta, Bruno, 1998.
"Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study,"
University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series
qt1vn4h7x5, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Costa-Gomes, Miguel & Crawford, Vincent P & Broseta, Bruno, 2001. "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1193-1235, September.
- Broseta, Bruno & Costa-Gomes, Miguel & Crawford, Vincent P., 2000. "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt0fp8278k, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Miguel Costa-Gomes & Vincent P. Crawford & Bruno Broseta, . "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games:An Experimental Study," Discussion Papers 00/45, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2004.
"Regular quantal response equilibrium,"
1203, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Maria Giovanna Devetag & Massimo Warglien, 2002.
"Games and phone numbers: do short term memory bounds affect strategic behavior?,"
CEEL Working Papers
0211, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
- Devetag, Giovanna & Warglien, Massimo, 2003. "Games and phone numbers: Do short-term memory bounds affect strategic behavior?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 189-202, April.
- Giovanna Devetag & Massimo Warglien, 2002. "Games and Phone Numbers: Do Short Term Memory Bounds Affect Strategy Behavior?," ROCK Working Papers 018, Department of Computer and Management Sciences, University of Trento, Italy, revised 13 Jun 2008.
- Jack Ochs, 1990. "The Coordination Problem in Decentralized Markets: An Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(2), pages 545-559.
- Kets, W., 2007.
"The Minority Game : An Economics Perspective,"
2007-53, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Erev, Ido & Rapoport, Amnon, 1998. "Coordination, "Magic," and Reinforcement Learning in a Market Entry Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 146-175, May.
- Challet, D. & Zhang, Y.-C., 1997. "Emergence of cooperation and organization in an evolutionary game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 246(3), pages 407-418.
- Willemien Kets, 2012. "Learning With Fixed Rules: The Minority Game," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(5), pages 865-878, December.
- Challet, Damien & Zhang, Yi-Cheng, 1998. "On the minority game: Analytical and numerical studies," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 256(3), pages 514-532.
- Thorsten Chmura & Werner Güth & Thomas Pitz & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2010.
"The Minority of Three-Game: An Experimental and Theoretical Analysis,"
Jena Economic Research Papers
2010-071, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
- Thorsten Chmura & Werner GÃ¼th, 2011. "The Minority of Three-Game: An Experimental and Theoretical Analysis," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 2(3), pages 333-354, September.
- Reinhard Selten & Michael Schreckenberg & Thomas Pitz & Thorsten Chmura & Sebastian Kube, 2002.
"Experiments and Simulations on Day-to-Day Route Choice-Behaviour,"
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers
bgse35_2002, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Reinhard Selten & M. Schreckenberg & Thomas Pitz & T. Chmura & S. Kube, 2003. "Experiments and Simulations on Day-to-Day Route Choice-Behaviour," CESifo Working Paper Series 900, CESifo Group Munich.
- Meyer, Donald J, et al, 1992. "History's Role in Coordinating Decentralized Allocation Decisions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(2), pages 292-316, April.
- Duffy, John & Hopkins, Ed, 2005.
"Learning, information, and sorting in market entry games: theory and evidence,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 31-62, April.
- John Duffy & Ed Hopkins, 2010. "Learning, Information and Sorting in Market Entry Games: Theory and Evidence," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000355, David K. Levine.
- John Duffy & Ed Hopkins, 2001. "Learning, Information and Sorting in Market Entry Games: Theory and Evidence," ESE Discussion Papers 78, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Selten, R. & Chmura, T. & Pitz, T. & Kube, S. & Schreckenberg, M., 2007. "Commuters route choice behaviour," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 394-406, February.
- Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-81, September.
- Giulio Bottazzi & Giovanna Devetag, 2007. "Competition and coordination in experimental minority games," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 241-275, June.
- Rami Zwick & Amnon Rapoport, 1999.
"Tacit Coordination in a Decentralized Market Entry Game with Fixed Capacity,"
- Rami Zwick & Amnon Rapoport, 2002. "Tacit Coordination in a Decentralized Market Entry Game with Fixed Capacity," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 253-272, December.
- Kets, W. & Voorneveld, M., 2007. "Congestion, Equilibrium and Learning : The Minority Game," Discussion Paper 2007-61, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Eyal Winter & Amnon Rapoport & Darryl A. Seale, 2000. "An experimental study of coordination and learning in iterated two-market entry games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 661-687.
- Colin F. Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho & Juin-Kuan Chong, 2004. "A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(3), pages 861-898.
- Arthur, W Brian, 1989. "Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(394), pages 116-31, March.
- Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-26, December.
- Amnon Rapoport & Darryl A. Seale & Ido Erev & James A. Sundali, 1998. "Equilibrium Play in Large Group Market Entry Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(1), pages 119-141, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp770. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Task Force CeSIA DSE)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.