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Fiscal transfers, local government, and entrepreneurship

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  • Piotr Danisewicz
  • Steven Ongena

Abstract

Can local government spending spur entrepreneurial activity? To answer this question, we study a setting where, around multiple pre‐determined and non‐manipulable thresholds, municipalities with lower tax revenues receive direct and different monetary grants from the national budget. Employing a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, we find a positive impact of fiscal transfers on the number of firms, especially sole proprietorships and small firms. The impact is stronger in municipalities where the opposition is more involved in the legislative process or more parties are represented in the municipal council.

Suggested Citation

  • Piotr Danisewicz & Steven Ongena, 2024. "Fiscal transfers, local government, and entrepreneurship," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(3), pages 818-845, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:43:y:2024:i:3:p:818-845
    DOI: 10.1002/pam.22532
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    Cited by:

    1. Diana Bonfim & Miguel A. Ferreira & Francisco Queiro & Sujiao (Emma) Zhao, 2023. "Fiscal policy and credit supply: The procurement channel," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp644, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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