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Burden sharing in a greenhouse: egalitarianism and sovereignty reconciled

  • Christoph Bohringer
  • Heinz Welsch

The allocation of emission entitlements across countries is the single most controversial issue in international climate policy. Extreme positions within the policy debate range from entitlements based on current emission patterns (sovereignty) to entitlements based on equal-per-capita allocations (egalitarianism). This paper shows that gradual convergence from sovereignty towards egalitarianism could provide a pragmatic solution to the equity debate: When combined with international emissions trading, the convergence approach stands out for offering the developing countries substantial incentives for participation in the international greenhouse gas abatement effort without imposing excessive burdens on the industrialized countries.

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Article provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Applied Economics.

Volume (Year): 38 (2006)
Issue (Month): 9 ()
Pages: 981-996

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Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:38:y:2006:i:9:p:981-996
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