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Credible enough? Forward guidance and perceived National Bank of Poland's policy rule

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  • Paweł Baranowski
  • Paweł Gajewski

Abstract

Forward guidance effectiveness is conditional upon its credibility. This policy, when taken as credible, should reduce the perceived impact of macroeconomic variables on the interest rate. Using the Taylor rule framework and employing micro-level data set, we test the perception of monetary policy in Poland among professional forecasters. Our results show that the Taylor principle is violated in the forward guidance period, which provides evidence for forward guidance credibility.

Suggested Citation

  • Paweł Baranowski & Paweł Gajewski, 2016. "Credible enough? Forward guidance and perceived National Bank of Poland's policy rule," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(2), pages 89-92, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:23:y:2016:i:2:p:89-92
    DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2015.1051651
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dennis, Richard, 2014. "Imperfect credibility and robust monetary policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 218-234.
    2. Sznajderska, Anna, 2014. "Asymmetric effects in the Polish monetary policy rule," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 547-556.
    3. Caraiani, Petre, 2013. "Comparing monetary policy rules in CEE economies: A Bayesian approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 233-246.
    4. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Michael Woodford, 2003. "The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 34(1), pages 139-235.
    5. Bodenstein, Martin & Hebden, James & Nunes, Ricardo, 2012. "Imperfect credibility and the zero lower bound," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 135-149.
    6. Carvalho, Carlos & Nechio, Fernanda, 2014. "Do people understand monetary policy?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 108-123.
    7. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bogdan CAPRARU & Norel Ionut MOISE & Andrei RADULESCU, 2015. "The Monetary Policy Of The National Bank Of Romania In The Inflation Targeting Era. A Taylor Rule Approach," Review of Economic and Business Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, issue 16, pages 91-102, December.
    2. Monica Jain & Christopher S. Sutherland, 2020. "How Do Central Bank Projections and Forward Guidance Influence Private-Sector Forecasts?," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 16(5), pages 179-218, October.
    3. Aleksandra Halka, 2015. "Lessons from the crisis.Did central banks do their homework?," NBP Working Papers 224, Narodowy Bank Polski.
    4. repec:prg:jnlpep:v:preprint:id:631:p:1-19 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Mariusz Górajski, 2018. "Robust Monetary Policy in a Model of the Polish Economy: Is the Uncertainty Responsible for the Interest Rate Smoothing Effect?," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 52(2), pages 313-340, August.
    6. Abuselidze, George, 2018. "Modern Challenges of Monetary Policy Strategies: Inflation and Devaluation Influence on Economic Development of the Country," MPRA Paper 99885, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Jan 2019.
    7. Baranowski, Paweł & Doryń, Wirginia & Łyziak, Tomasz & Stanisławska, Ewa, 2021. "Words and deeds in managing expectations: Empirical evidence from an inflation targeting economy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 49-67.
    8. Maciej Ryczkowski, 2017. "Forward Guidance, Pros, Cons and Credibility," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2017(5), pages 523-541.
    9. Łukasz Goczek & Dagmara Mycielska, 2019. "Actual monetary policy independence in a small open economy: the Polish perspective," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 499-522, February.
    10. Maciej Ryczkowski, 2016. "Poland as an inflation nutter:The story of successful output stabilization," Zbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci/Proceedings of Rijeka Faculty of Economics, University of Rijeka, Faculty of Economics and Business, vol. 34(2), pages 363-392.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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