IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/snopef/v1y2020i4d10.1007_s43069-020-00034-z.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Regional Collaborative Electricity Consumption Management: an Urban Operations Research Model

Author

Listed:
  • Yingxuan Zhang

    () (Hong Kong Shue Yan University
    Victoria University)

Abstract

Electricity generation can be a major source of pollution. In a compact region where pollutants can easily transfer from one city to another, a unilateral response—on the part of one city to improve its environmental conditions—is often ineffective. This paper develops an urban operations research model for collaborative management of a reduction in electricity consumption. This model internalizes the external costs of electricity consumption in a region; derives the optimal level of electricity consumption; and sets up a scheme to compensate for the externalities of electricity consumption. This analysis is the first urban operations research model for collaborative electricity consumption management, which internalizes the external costs of electricity consumption. This study is also the first attempt to derive the optimal level of electricity consumption within regional collaboration. This is the first time that a scheme to compensate for the externalities is proposed to ensure that agreed-upon optimality principle could be maintained throughout the entire duration of cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Yingxuan Zhang, 2020. "Regional Collaborative Electricity Consumption Management: an Urban Operations Research Model," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 1-28, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:snopef:v:1:y:2020:i:4:d:10.1007_s43069-020-00034-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s43069-020-00034-z
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s43069-020-00034-z
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shamir, Uri, 1980. "Application of operations research in Israel's water sector," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 5(5), pages 332-345, November.
    2. Kim Hang Pham Do & Ariel Dinar & Daene Mckinney, 2012. "Transboundary Water Management: Can Issue Linkage Help Mitigate Externalities?," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 14(01), pages 1-20.
    3. Ang, B. W., 1991. "A statistical analysis of energy coefficients," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 93-110, April.
    4. Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 1997. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 26(3), pages 379-401.
    5. Chen, Xiaoguang & Ye, Jingjing, 2017. "When the Wind Blows: Spatial Spillover Effects of Urban Air Pollution," 2017 Annual Meeting, July 30-August 1, Chicago, Illinois 258256, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    6. De Cian, Enrica & Tavoni, Massimo, 2012. "Do technology externalities justify restrictions on emission permit trading?," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 624-646.
    7. Shoude Li, 2014. "A Differential Game of Transboundary Industrial Pollution with Emission Permits Trading," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 163(2), pages 642-659, November.
    8. David W. K. Yeung & Leon A. Petrosyan, 2016. "A Cooperative Dynamic Environmental Game of Subgame Consistent Clean Technology Development," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(02), pages 1-23, June.
    9. Brookes, L G, 1972. "More on the Output Elasticity of Energy Consumption," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 83-92, November.
    10. Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 1995. "A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 2(2), pages 279-293, August.
    11. Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1992. "Theoretical foundations of negotiations and cost sharing in transfrontier pollution problems," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 388-399, April.
    12. David Yeung, 2014. "Dynamically consistent collaborative environmental management with production technique choices," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 220(1), pages 181-204, September.
    13. Banzhaf, H. Spencer & Chupp, B. Andrew, 2012. "Fiscal federalism and interjurisdictional externalities: New results and an application to US Air pollution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(5), pages 449-464.
    14. Daniel, S. E. & Diakoulaki, D. C. & Pappis, C. P., 1997. "Operations research and environmental planning," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 248-263, October.
    15. Anthony D. Owen, 2004. "Environmental Externalities, Market Distortions and the Economics of Renewable Energy Technologies," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 127-158.
    16. Antoci, Angelo & Russu, Paolo & Ticci, Elisa, 2012. "Environmental externalities and immiserizing structural changes in an economy with heterogeneous agents," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 80-91.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Charles Figuières & Magali Verdonck, 2003. "On the Core of an Economy with Multilateral and Multidimensional Environmental Externalities," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(3), pages 1-10.
    2. Chander, Parkash & Khan, M. Ali, 2001. "International treaties on trade and global pollution," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 303-324, December.
    3. Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens & Jean-Pascal van Ypersele & Stephane Willems, 1999. "The Kyoto Protocol: An Economic and Game Theoretic Interpretation," CESifo Working Paper Series 229, CESifo.
    4. Germain, Marc & Tulkens, Henry & Magnus, Alphonse, 2010. "Dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in a two-dimensional international environmental model," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 208-226, March.
    5. Marta Biancardi & Giovanni Villani, 2009. "International Environmental Agreements with Asymmetric Countries," Quaderni DSEMS 09-2009, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia.
    6. Lassi Ahlvik & Yulia Pavlova, 2013. "A Strategic Analysis of Eutrophication Abatement in the Baltic Sea," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 56(3), pages 353-378, November.
    7. Pierre Courtois & Jean-Christophe Péreau & Tarik Tazdaït, 2004. "Une approche évolutionnaire des négociations internationales en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 70(1), pages 31-51.
    8. Porchiung Chou & Cheickna Sylla, 2008. "The formation of an international environmental agreement as a two-stage exclusive cartel formation game with transferable utilities," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 317-341, December.
    9. Sudhir A. Shah, 2010. "A Noncooperative Quantity‐Rationing Theory of Transboundary Pollution," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(3), pages 437-470, June.
    10. Sudhir A. Shah, 2006. "A Non-Cooperative Theory Of Quantity-Rationing International Transfrontier Pollution," Working papers 143, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    11. Sudhir A. Shah, 2004. "Allocations and manipulation in Kyoto type protocols," Working papers 125, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    12. László Á. Kóczy, 2018. "Partition Function Form Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-319-69841-0, September.
    13. Barrett, Scott, 2001. "International cooperation for sale," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(10), pages 1835-1850, December.
    14. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2003:i:3:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2006. "New roads to international environmental agreements: the case of global warming," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 7(4), pages 391-414, December.
    16. Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2008. "Evolution in time of Farsightedly Stable Coalitions: An Application of FUND," Working Papers FNU-162, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised May 2008.
    17. Romera, Rosario & Casas, Omar J., 2011. "The international stock pollutant control: a stochastic formulation with transfers," DES - Working Papers. Statistics and Econometrics. WS ws112217, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Estadística.
    18. Ansink, Erik & Gengenbach, Michael & Weikard, Hans-Peter, 2012. "River Sharing and Water Trade," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 122860, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    19. Eyckmans, Johan & Tulkens, Henry, 2003. "Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 299-327, October.
    20. Zili Yang, 2016. "Mitigation Cost And Climate Damage Versus Incentive Shifts Of Climate Coalition," Climate Change Economics (CCE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(04), pages 1-24, November.
    21. Bosello, Francesco & Buchner, Barbara & Carraro, Carlo & Raggi, Davide, 2003. "Can Equity Enhance Efficiency? Some Lessons from Climate Negotiations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3606, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:snopef:v:1:y:2020:i:4:d:10.1007_s43069-020-00034-z. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.