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Börsenrückzüge infolge steigender Corporate-Governance-Anforderungen – Empirische Evidenz von 13 europäischen Kapitalmärkten
[Delistings due to Increased Corporate Governance Requirements – Empirical Evidence from 13 European Capital Markets]

Author

Listed:
  • Marc Berninger

    (Technische Universität Darmstadt)

  • Markus Klug

    (Technische Universität Darmstadt)

  • Dirk Schiereck

    (Technische Universität Darmstadt)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung Die Notierungszahlen an den großen Börsenplätzen der westlichen Welt sind seit längerer Zeit stark rückläufig. Nicht nur die Börsenplatzbetreiber, sondern zunehmend auch die Politik und Wissenschaft befassen sich mit diesem Trend, bevorzugt ausgehend von der Fragestellung, wie neue Unternehmen für einen Börsengang gewonnen werden können. Gleichzeitig zeichnen sich in den vergangenen Jahren jedoch auch bedeutsame Veränderungen im regulatorischen Umfeld börsennotierter Unternehmen ab, die die Rechte von Aktionären stärken sowie insbesondere die Transparenz und Korrektheit der Rechnungslegung erhöhen sollen. Während dadurch das Nutzenniveau der Kapitalgeberseite gesteigert wurde, haben die neuen Regulierungen für börsennotierte Unternehmen auf der Kapitalnehmerseite für Zusatzkosten gesorgt, die insbesondere kleine Unternehmen belasten und einen Börsenrückzug nahelegen könnten. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird anhand eines umfassenden Paneldatensatzes aus 770 Delistingankündigungen für 13 europäische Börsenplätze für den Zeitraum 2005 bis 2016 mittels (multinomialen) logistischen Regressionen das Zusammenwirken aus Veränderungen im Regulierungsniveau und der Aufkündigung von Börsennotierungen durch kapitalmarktorientierte Unternehmen untersucht. Es kann für alle untersuchten Länder ein signifikanter Zusammenhang zwischen steigenden Corporate Governance-Anforderungen und einer Zunahme von Börsenrückzügen beobachtet werden. Allerdings ist der in früheren Studien beobachtete Rückgang insolvenzbedingter Börsenrückzüge nicht mehr feststellbar. Die präsentierten Ergebnisse sind robust unter Verwendung mehrerer unabhängiger „Shareholder Protection“-Indizes.

Suggested Citation

  • Marc Berninger & Markus Klug & Dirk Schiereck, 2018. "Börsenrückzüge infolge steigender Corporate-Governance-Anforderungen – Empirische Evidenz von 13 europäischen Kapitalmärkten [Delistings due to Increased Corporate Governance Requirements – Empiric," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 70(4), pages 351-391, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:70:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s41471-018-0058-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s41471-018-0058-0
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