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Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric Approach



    () (University of Cambridge)


    (University of Cambridge)


In this article we build a new and meaningful shareholder protection index for five countries and code the development of the law for over three decades. This quantification of legal rules (“leximetrics†) provides interesting possibilities for comparing variations across time series and across legal systems. For instance, our study finds, that in all of our panel countries shareholder protection has been improving in the last three decades; that the protection of minority against majority shareholders is considerably stronger in “blockholder countries†as compared to the non-blockholder countries and that convergence in shareholder protection is taking place since 1993 and is increasing since 2001. Finally, our examination of the legal differences between the five countries does not confirm the distinction between common law and civil law countries

Suggested Citation

  • Priya P. Lele & Mathias M. Siems, 2007. "Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric Approach," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2006 170, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
  • Handle: RePEc:mmf:mmfc06:170

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    1. Rafael Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2006. "What Works in Securities Laws?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(1), pages 1-32, February.
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    4. Erik BERGLÖF & Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN, 1999. "The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm : Implications for Transition and Developing Countries," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9912, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
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    6. Cheffins, Brian R, 2001. "Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 459-484, Part I Ju.
    7. Marco Pagano & Paolo F. Volpin, 2005. "The Political Economy of Corporate Governance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1005-1030, September.
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    11. Tom Ginsburg & Robert Cooter, "undated". "Leximetrics: Why the Same Laws are Longer in Some Countries than Others," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1080, American Law & Economics Association.
    12. Roberta Romano, 2004. "The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2653, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Jul 2005.
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    More about this item


    Shareholder protection; leximetrics; numerical comparative law; law and;

    JEL classification:

    • G00 - Financial Economics - - General - - - General
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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