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Measuring the Invisible: An Overview of and Outlook for Tax Non-Compliance Estimates and Measurement Methods for Switzerland

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  • Felix Schmutz

Abstract

This paper gives an overview of tax non-compliance estimates and evaluates the suitability of various tax non-compliance measurement methods for Switzerland. The existing estimates for Switzerland focus strongly on non-declared assets and are based on a limited number of measurement methods. Nevertheless, the estimates range widely, between CHF 106 to over 500 billion for non-declared assets and 12.6 to 35.1 percent for income, for the time period 1970 to today. These estimates could be taken as a starting point for further tax non-compliance research. They should however be verified and supplemented by estimates resulting from other methods as a solid measurement of tax non-compliance requires a comprehensive approach including several methods. Further, the focus should shift from non-declared assets towards non-declared income.

Suggested Citation

  • Felix Schmutz, 2016. "Measuring the Invisible: An Overview of and Outlook for Tax Non-Compliance Estimates and Measurement Methods for Switzerland," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 152(II), pages 125-177, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:ses:arsjes:2016-ii-3
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    shadow economy; underground economy; tax compliance; tax evasion;

    JEL classification:

    • E26 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Informal Economy; Underground Economy
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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