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Fiscal Policies and Monetary Leadership in a Monetary Union with a Deficit-Concerned Central Bank

Author

Listed:
  • Georgios Chortareas

    (University of Athens)

  • Christos Mavrodimitrakis

    (University of Athens)

Abstract

We consider fiscal and monetary policy interactions in a monetary union under monetary leadership, when the common central bank is concerned with the average fiscal stance of the union. We use a static two-country monetary union model to investigate the policy-mix problem under different regimes of noncooperation, cooperation, and enforced cooperation among fiscal authorities. We find that fiscal policy is unambiguously countercyclical, a feature that is more pronounced under fiscal policy cooperation. Monetary policy can be either countercyclical or procyclical. A central bank concerned about the aggregate fiscal stance is effective in stabilizing output and central budget, but at the expense of inflation stabilization.

Suggested Citation

  • Georgios Chortareas & Christos Mavrodimitrakis, 2011. "Fiscal Policies and Monetary Leadership in a Monetary Union with a Deficit-Concerned Central Bank," Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics, Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics, vol. 3(1), pages 1-24, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:psc:journl:v:3:y:2011:i:1:p:1-24
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    strategic interactions; EMU; monetary leadership; fiscal cooperation; central bank's objectives;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy

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