IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Une analyse économique des "signes de qualité". Labels et certification des produits


  • Laurent Linnemer
  • Anne Perrot


[eng] An economic analysis of quality signals: labels and product quality certification. . This paper studies quality signalling strategies of a monopolist who offers a good of unknown quality. Four institutional environments are examined: no signal is available, only certification is available, only label is available and both certification and label are possible. For each possible values of certification and label costs, we characterize the equilibria of the signalling game. A coordination problem arises when the label exists, which could interfere with competition policy. A great number of equilibrium configurations may appear, which can be linked to a criticism that is often opposed to label and certification policies: that they may spread confusion in consumers' perception. [fre] Cet article examine les stratégies de révélation de la qualité par un monopole offrant un bien de qualité inconnue. Nous examinons quatre environnements institutionnels : aucun signe de qualité n'est accessible, seule la certification est possible, seule l'adhésion à un label existe et enfin certification et label coexistent. Nous déterminons les équilibres dans chacun de ces environnements pour chaque configuration des coûts de label et de certification ainsi que du seuil de label. Le label soulève un problème de coordination entre les types possibles du monopole. De nombreuses configurations d'équilibre sont possibles, ce qui fait écho à la critique souvent adressée aux politiques de signes de qualité d'entretenir une certaine confusion dans l'esprit des consommateurs.

Suggested Citation

  • Laurent Linnemer & Anne Perrot, 2000. "Une analyse économique des "signes de qualité". Labels et certification des produits," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 51(6), pages 1397-1418.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2000_num_51_6_410591
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.2000.410591

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Anne Perrot & Laurent Linnemer, 2007. "Conflits liés à la certification dans une relation commerciale," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 178(2), pages 15-24.
    2. Eric Giraud-Héraud & Claire Chambolle, 2003. "Certification de la qualité par une AOC : un modèle d’analyse," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 159(3), pages 83-91.
    3. R. Bentley & Michael O’Brien & Paul Ormerod, 2011. "Quality versus mere popularity: a conceptual map for understanding human behavior," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 10(2), pages 181-191, December.
    4. Cagé, Julia & Rouzet, Dorothée, 2015. "Improving “national brands”: Reputation for quality and export promotion strategies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(2), pages 274-290.
    5. Chanteau, Jean-Pierre, 2011. "L’économie de la responsabilité sociétale d’entreprise (RSE) :éléments de méthode institutionnaliste," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 9.

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2000_num_51_6_410591. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Equipe PERSEE). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.