IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prs/ecoprv/ecop_0249-4744_2003_num_159_3_6914.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Certification de la qualité par une AOC : un modèle d’analyse

Author

Listed:
  • Eric Giraud-Héraud
  • Claire Chambolle

Abstract

[eng] Quality certification through a registered designation of origin : an analytical model.. International competition on the wine market is characterised by a disparity of strategies applied by producers and wine-producing regions. We provide a theoretical analysis of the producers’ choice between the two main brand strategies : a private brand name and a brand carrying a public certification such as the French “ Appellation d’Origine Contrôlée” (AOC). We show that the latter can be profitable by comparison with the private brand name strategy. However, such a system can lead to underinvestment in quality that can reduce consumer’s surplus. [fre] La concurrence internationale sur le marché du vin est caractérisée par une diversité des stratégies mises en oeuvre. Nous proposons une analyse formalisée de l’arbitrage économique prévalant entre deux cas polaires de comportement stratégique des producteurs : une stratégie de marque purement privée et une stratégie de marque adossée à un système d’Appellation d’Origine Contrôlée (AOC). Nous montrons comment ce dernier cas de figure peut être préféré par les producteurs mais qu’il comporte des risques de sous-investissement qui peuvent être préjudiciables au surplus des consommateurs.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Giraud-Héraud & Claire Chambolle, 2003. "Certification de la qualité par une AOC : un modèle d’analyse," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 159(3), pages 83-91.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2003_num_159_3_6914
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.2003.6914
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2003.6914
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3406/ecop.2003.6914
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/ecop_0249-4744_2003_num_159_3_6914
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.3406/ecop.2003.6914?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Motta, Massimo, 1993. "Endogenous Quality Choice: Price vs. Quantity Competition," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 113-131, June.
    2. Egizio Valceschini & Armelle Maze, 2000. "La politique de la qualité agro-alimentaire dans le contexte international," Économie rurale, Programme National Persée, vol. 258(1), pages 30-41.
    3. Laurent Linnemer & Anne Perrot, 2000. "Une analyse économique des "signes de qualité". Labels et certification des produits," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 51(6), pages 1397-1418.
    4. Marette, Stephan & Crespi, John M & Schiavina, Allesandra, 1999. "The Role of Common Labelling in a Context of Asymmetric Information," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 26(2), pages 167-178, June.
    5. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Marc Callois, 2006. "Quality labels and rural development : a new economic geography approach," Post-Print hal-01201116, HAL.
    2. Jean-Marc Callois, 2006. "Quality labels and rural development : a new economic geography approach," Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 78, pages 31-51.
    3. Bouamra-Mechemache Zohra & Chaaban Jad, 2010. "Protected Designation of Origin Revisited," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-29, August.
    4. Maria de Fátima Souza & Ana Carvalho, 2018. "An Organizational Capacity model for wine cooperatives," NIPE Working Papers 10/2018, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    5. Callois, Jean-Marc, 2006. "Quality labels and rural development : a new economic geography approach," Cahiers d'Economie et de Sociologie Rurales (CESR), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), vol. 78.
    6. Fares, M’hand & Raza, Saqlain & Thomas, Alban, 2018. "Is there complementarity between labels and brands? Evidence from small French co-operatives," TSE Working Papers 18-895, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    7. M’hand Fares & Saqlain Raza & Alban Thomas, 2018. "Is There Complementarity Between Certified Labels and Brands? Evidence from Small French Cooperatives," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 53(2), pages 367-395, September.
    8. Pascale Ertus & Céline Jacob & Christine Petr, 2017. "Quel Contenu Informationnel Proposé Pour Améliorer La Perception De La Qualité Du Vin Du Consommateur ?," Post-Print hal-01599008, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Zago, Angelo M. & Pick, Daniel H., 2004. "Labeling Policies in Food Markets: Private Incentives, Public Intervention, and Welfare Effects," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 29(1), pages 1-16, April.
    2. Marion Desquilbet & Sylvette Monier-Dilhan, 2015. "Are geographical indications a worthy quality label? A framework with endogenous quality choice," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 42(1), pages 129-150.
    3. José A. Novo‐Peteiro, 2023. "Product design with attribute dependence," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 91(4), pages 361-385, July.
    4. Francisco Martínez-Sánchez, 2016. "Versioning Goods and Joint Purchase: Substitution and Complementarity Strategies," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2016(5), pages 577-590.
    5. Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu, 2005. "Quality choice, the Coase problem, and a fixed cost function of quality: a note," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(7), pages 453-455.
    6. Ya‐chin Wang & Leonard F.s. Wang, 2009. "Equivalence Of Competition Mode In A Vertically Differentiated Duopoly With Delegation," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 77(4), pages 577-590, December.
    7. L. Lambertini & A. Tampieri, 2012. "On the Emergence of Overcompliance with Endogenous Environmental Standards and Patronising Consumers," Working Papers wp847, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    8. Gabszewicz, J. & Turrini, A., 2000. "Workers' skills, product quality and industry equilibrium," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 575-593, May.
    9. Olivier Bonroy, 2006. "Le standard de qualité minimale est-il un instrument socialement optimal ?. Une revue de littérature," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(1), pages 35-53.
    10. Nabin, Munirul H. & Nguyen, Xuan & Sgro, Pasquale M. & Chao, Chi-Chur, 2014. "Strategic quality competition, mixed oligopoly and privatization," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 142-150.
    11. L. Colombo & L. Lambertini, 2003. "Dynamic Advertising Under Vertical Product Differentiation," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 119(2), pages 261-280, November.
    12. Stephen Martin, 2015. "Refusal to Deal and Investment in Product Quality," Research in Law and Economics, in: Economic and Legal Issues in Competition, Intellectual Property, Bankruptcy, and the Cost of Raising Children, volume 27, pages 43-66, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    13. Cellini, Roberto & Siciliani, Luigi & Straume, Odd Rune, 2018. "A dynamic model of quality competition with endogenous prices," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 190-206.
    14. VANDEBUSSCHE, Hylke & WAUTHY, Xavier, 1999. "European antidumping policy and firms' strategic cholce of quality," Working Papers 1999007, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    15. Jen-Te Yao, 2005. "Counterfeiting and an Optimal Monitoring Policy," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 95-114, January.
    16. Lutz, Stefan H., 2002. "The Effects of Quotas on Vertical Intra-Industry Trade," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-61, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    17. Ann Horowitz & Ira Horowitz, 1999. "Quality choice: Does it matter which workers own and manage the cooperative firm?," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 27(4), pages 394-409, December.
    18. Mario Pezzino, 2010. "Hospital competition when patients have different willingness to pay for quality," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1014, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    19. Brekke, Kurt R. & Siciliani, Luigi & Straume, Odd Rune, 2010. "Price and quality in spatial competition," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 471-480, November.
    20. Luo, Zheng & Chen, Xu & Chen, Jing & Wang, Xiaojun, 2017. "Optimal pricing policies for differentiated brands under different supply chain power structures," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 259(2), pages 437-451.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2003_num_159_3_6914. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Equipe PERSEE (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.persee.fr/collection/ecop .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.