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Quality Certification by Geographical Indications, Trademarks and Firm Reputation

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  • Menapace, Luisa
  • Moschini, GianCarlo

Abstract

We study firm reputation as a mechanism to assure product quality in perfectly competitive markets in a context in which both certification and trademarks are available. Shapiro’s (1983) model of reputation is extended to reflect both collective and firm-specific reputations, and this framework is used to study certification and trademarks for food products with a regional identity, known as geographical indications (GIs). Our model yields two primary results. First, in markets with asymmetric information and moral hazard problems, credible certification schemes reduce the cost of establishing reputation and lead to welfare gains compared to a situation in which only private trademarks are available. Hence, certification improves the ability of reputation to operate as a mechanism for assuring quality. Second, the actual design of the certification scheme plays an important role in mitigating informational problems. From a policy perspective, our results have implications for the current debate and negotiations on GIs at the World Trade Organization and the ongoing product quality policy reform within the European Union. With regard to the instrument of choice to provide intellectual property protection for GIs, our model favors a sui generis scheme based on appellations over certification marks. Finally, our model supports the validity of the traditional specialities guaranteed scheme of the European Union as an instrument for the provision of high-quality products that are not linked to a geographic area.

Suggested Citation

  • Menapace, Luisa & Moschini, GianCarlo, 2010. "Quality Certification by Geographical Indications, Trademarks and Firm Reputation," 2010 Annual Meeting, July 25-27, 2010, Denver, Colorado 61778, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea10:61778
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.61778
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. GianCarlo Moschini, 2004. "Intellectual Property Rights and the World Trade Organization: Retrospect and Prospects," Chapters, in: Giovanni Anania & Mary E.. Bohman & Colin A. Carter & Alex F. McCalla (ed.), Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO, chapter 19, pages 474-511, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental Economics and Policy;

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • Q10 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - General

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