IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/rvr/journl/20119328.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

L’économie de la responsabilité sociétale d’entreprise (RSE) :éléments de méthode institutionnaliste

Author

Listed:
  • Chanteau, Jean-Pierre

Abstract

La responsabilité sociétale des entreprises (rse) incorpore une dimension politique et morale qui ne peut se réduire à la performance sociétale – dont traite habituellement l’économie de la rse – mais qui l’impacte : l’analyse de cette dimension est donc indispensable à l’analyse économique. Cet article propose des éléments méthodologiques pour endogénéiser ce facteur institutionnel dans l’analyse. Une première partie présente le cadre d’analyse des dispositifs symboliques d’une norme de qualité visant à objectiver ses caractéristiques, attester la conformité à cette qualité et la valoriser à un niveau satisfaisant aux conditions du marché. La difficulté est que cette qualité – typique de biens de réputation – porte sur des propriétés de l’organisation productive et du produit qui ne peuvent être confirmées par leur valeur d’usage. La seconde partie montre que i) les conditions institutionnelles sur l’identité, la conformité et la rentabilité nécessaires ne sont pas encore réunies pour assurer la diffusion de la qualité rse par une voie non réglementaire ; et que ii) deux types de conceptions managériales et politiques de la rse divergent quant à la traduction de la rse au niveau opérationnel et de la structure du gouvernement de l’entreprise.

Suggested Citation

  • Chanteau, Jean-Pierre, 2011. "L’économie de la responsabilité sociétale d’entreprise (RSE) :éléments de méthode institutionnaliste," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 9.
  • Handle: RePEc:rvr:journl:2011:9328
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://regulation.revues.org/9328
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://regulation.revues.org/pdf/9328
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean-Pierre Chanteau, 2008. "La Diversité Des « Commerces Équitables » Face Aux Inégalités Économiques : Une Analyse Institutionnaliste Comparative," Revue Tiers-Monde, Armand Colin, vol. 0(3), pages 555-572.
    2. John B. Davis, 2007. "Akerlof and Kranton on identity in economics: inverting the analysis," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(3), pages 349-362, May.
    3. François Eymard-Duvernay, 1989. "Conventions de qualité et formes de coordination," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 40(2), pages 329-360.
    4. Hounaida Ben Youssef & Gilles Grolleau & Khaïreddine Jebsi, 2005. "L'utilisation stratégique des instances de normalisation environnementale," Revue internationale de droit économique, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(4), pages 367-388.
    5. Bodet, Catherine & Lamarche, Thomas, 2007. "La Responsabilité sociale des entreprises comme innovation institutionnelle. Une lecture régulationniste," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 1.
    6. Jean-Pierre Chanteau, 2003. "La dimension socio-cognitive des institutions et de la rationalité : éléments pour une approche holindividualiste," Post-Print halshs-00107996, HAL.
    7. Forest L. Reinhardt & Robert N. Stavins & Richard H. K. Vietor, 2008. "Corporate Social Responsibility Through an Economic Lens," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 219-239, Summer.
    8. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2005. "Identity and the Economics of Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 9-32, Winter.
    9. Ben Fine, 2009. "The economics of identity and the identity of economics?," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(2), pages 175-191, March.
    10. Laurent Linnemer & Anne Perrot, 2000. "Une analyse économique des "signes de qualité". Labels et certification des produits," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 51(6), pages 1397-1418.
    11. Richard A. Wolfe & Daniel S. Putler, 2002. "How Tight Are the Ties that Bind Stakeholder Groups?," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 13(1), pages 64-80, February.
    12. Christainsen, Gregory B. & Haveman, Robert H., 1981. "The contribution of environmental regulations to the slowdown in productivity growth," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 381-390, December.
    13. Dominique Foray, 1993. "Standardisation et concurrence : des relations ambivalentes," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 63(1), pages 84-101.
    14. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    15. Kennedy, Peter, 1994. "Innovation stochastique et coût de la réglementation environnementale," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 70(2), pages 199-209, juin.
    16. Pierre-Yves Gomez, 1996. "Normalisation et gestion de la firme : une approche conventionnaliste," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 75(1), pages 113-131.
    17. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Adel Aloui & Khaled Saadaoui & Manal Wehbi Sleiman, 2015. "Le concept de parties prenantes : proposition d'une modélisation systémique par le modèle SAGACE," Post-Print hal-01870859, HAL.
    2. Séhier, Clément, 2014. "La responsabilité sociale des entreprises dans l’industrie chinoise : une recomposition de la relation salariale ?," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 15.
    3. Vincent Frigant, 2015. "Beyond The Business Case and Sustainable chain management: Why Do We Need to Build a Theory of Interfirm Social Responsability?," Post-Print hal-01426819, HAL.
    4. Lemeilleur, Sylvaine & Allaire, Gilles, 2016. "Standardisation and guarantee systems: what can participatory certification offer?," Working Papers MOISA 250275, Institut National de la recherché Agronomique (INRA), UMR MOISA : Marchés, Organisations, Institutions et Stratégies d'Acteurs : CIHEAM-IAMM, CIRAD, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro, Montpellier, France.
    5. Adel Aloui & Khaled Saadaoui & Manal Wehbi Sleiman, 2015. "Le concept de parties prenantes : proposition d'une modélisation systémique par le modèle SAGACE," Grenoble Ecole de Management (Post-Print) hal-01870859, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    2. R. Bentley & Michael O’Brien & Paul Ormerod, 2011. "Quality versus mere popularity: a conceptual map for understanding human behavior," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 10(2), pages 181-191, December.
    3. Cabrales, Antonio & Charness, Gary & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2006. "Competition, hidden information, and efficiency : an experiment," UC3M Working papers. Economics we071909, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    4. Lisette Ibanez & Gilles Grolleau, 2008. "Can Ecolabeling Schemes Preserve the Environment?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 40(2), pages 233-249, June.
    5. Florian Ederer & Ernst Fehr, 2007. "Deception and Incentives. How Dishonesty Undermines Effort Provision," IEW - Working Papers 341, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    6. Christoph March & Ina Schieferdecker, 2021. "Technological Sovereignty as Ability, Not Autarky," CESifo Working Paper Series 9139, CESifo.
    7. Stefan Ambec & Paul Lanoie, 2007. "When and Why Does It Pay To Be Green?," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-20, CIRANO.
    8. Luis Garicano & Tano Santos, 2004. "Referrals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 499-525, June.
    9. Bruno Deffains & Dominique Demougin, 2023. "Capitation taxes and the regulation of professional services," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 167-193, April.
    10. Ralph Chami & Connel Fullenkamp & Sunil Sharma, 2010. "A framework for financial market development," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 13(2), pages 107-135.
    11. Ambec, Stefan & Barla, Philippe, 2001. "Productivité et réglementation environnementale: une analyse de l'hypothèse de Porter," Cahiers de recherche 0107, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
    12. Gary Charness & Peter Kuhn & Marie Claire Villeval, 2011. "Competition and the Ratchet Effect," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(3), pages 513-547.
    13. Cabrales, Antonio & Charness, Gary, 2011. "Optimal contracts with team production and hidden information: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 163-176, February.
    14. Wagner, Stephan M. & Friedl, Gunther, 2007. "Supplier switching decisions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 183(2), pages 700-717, December.
    15. Geruso, Michael & McGuire, Thomas G., 2016. "Tradeoffs in the design of health plan payment systems: Fit, power and balance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 1-19.
    16. Leonhard K. Lades, 2012. "Impulsive Consumption and Reflexive Thought: Nudging Ethical Consumer Behavior," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2012-03, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
    17. Diane Rodet, 2015. "Solidarity economy and its qualities: a sector s' diversity analysed using "quality devices" [L'économie solidaire et ses qualités : diversité d'un secteur analysé au regard de ses dispos," Working Papers halshs-02329772, HAL.
    18. Liu, Ting & Albert Ma, Ching-to & Mak, Henry Y., 2018. "Incentives for motivated experts in a partnership," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 296-313.
    19. Josh Lerner, 2002. "When Bureaucrats Meet Entrepreneurs: The Design of Effective "Public Venture Capital" Programmes," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(477), pages 73-84, February.
    20. Clément Carbonnier, 2023. "Welfare Economics and Neoliberalism: Interpreting the ideal type of perfect competition general equilibrium," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-04062786, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    corporate governance; corporate social responsibility; institutionalist analysis; quality signals; analyse institutionnaliste; gouvernement d’entreprise; normes de qualité; responsabilité sociétale de l’entreprise;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility
    • P17 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Performance and Prospects

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rvr:journl:2011:9328. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Pascal Seppecher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://theorie-regulation.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.