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Unions monétaires, caisses d'émission et dollarisation : les fondements analytiques des systèmes de change « ultra-fixes »

  • Dominique Torre
  • Alain Raybaut

[fre] Cet article expose la logique, les conditions de validité et d'application des accords monétaires ultrafixes. Les fondements analytiques des unions monétaires marqués par l'incidence des débats de la macroéconomie contemporaine sur l'évolution de l'approche en termes de zones monétaires optimales sont d'abord envisagés. L'homogénéisation de la zone monétaire peut s'appuyer sur l'accord qui constitue l'union alors que la logique classique envisageait une causalité inverse. Puis les caisses d'émission et les formes de dollarisation, au caractère moins coopératif et plus asymétrique, sont considérées. La dollarisation système de régulation quasi-automatique par une monnaie d'ancrage extérieure, n'offre aucun moyen de contrôle par les autorités internes. Certaines marges de manoeuvre subsistent avec le currency board. L'article s'intéresse en particulier aux débats relatifs à la nature des régulations qui le caractérisent. . Classification JEL : E42, F33, F36 F41 [eng] Monetary unions, currency board and dollarization : analytical foundations of « ultra-fixed » currency arrangements . This paper aims at clarifying some analytical foundations and viability conditions of the so called « Ultra-fixed » currency arrangements. First, the main advances in the literature on monetary unions as optimal currency areas are dealt with. In contrast with the traditional view, it appears that a currency area can be a self-validating regime, which may foster ex-post economic integration. Second, we consider the case of dollarization and the currency board regimes characterized by non-cooperative and asymmetric features. The strong external peg arrangement characterizing dollarization rules out per se all kind of internal control by the domestic authorities. Some form of residual internal regulation remains still possible in the currency board regime. We particularly focus on the debates related to this issue where notions such as discipline, credibility and confidence are mainly called for. . JEL classification : E42, F33, F36, F41

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue d'économie financière.

Volume (Year): 75 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 37-54

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Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2004_num_75_2_4892
Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2004.4892
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