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CEO compensation and market risk: moderating effect of board size and CEO duality in the Swiss context

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  • Mehtap A. Eklund

    (University of Wisconsin La Crosse (UWL))

Abstract

This paper aims to find an answer to the questions of “whether chief executive officers (CEOs) are compensated for market risk”, and “how the combined interaction of board size and CEO duality moderates this relationship” from the tenets of agency theory and managerial power theory. Even though the contracting view of agency theory posits that agents are neither to be punished nor rewarded for events that go beyond their direct control (market risk), the research findings in the corporate governance domain are contradictory. It was found that Chinese and American executives were paid for market risk, including oil prices and exchange rates, which was explained by retention risk and weaker corporate governance systems. To shed light on previous inconclusive research, this paper investigates the topic further in a new country setting, that of Switzerland, because the previous results were mostly related to Anglo-Saxon countries. Switzerland is also one of the exemplary countries for executive compensation. Furthermore, it investigates the combined (cascaded) interaction effects of the board size and CEO duality on CEO compensation and market risk from the perspective of managerial power theory, which has not been previously analyzed in the literature to date. For the direct effect, in contrast to previous findings in Anglo-Saxon countries, it has been found that CEOs were not paid for market risk in Switzerland, which confirms agency theory’s contracting prediction. This finding outlines the future comparative research area in this domain. For the combined interaction effect, it has been found that board size incorporated with CEO duality is the significant cascaded moderator, and large boards with CEO duality are significantly more effective in controlling asymmetric compensation, which confirms the efficacy of large boards with CEO duality in coping with asymmetric compensation and managerial entrenchment (managerial power theory). These results have both practical and academic implications for boards of directors, Human Resources and corporate governance literature, agency theory, and managerial power theory, by providing further evidence on previous inconclusive findings on board size, CEO duality, and the role of market risk in the CEO pay structure.

Suggested Citation

  • Mehtap A. Eklund, 2024. "CEO compensation and market risk: moderating effect of board size and CEO duality in the Swiss context," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(2), pages 227-240, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:ijodag:v:21:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1057_s41310-023-00188-2
    DOI: 10.1057/s41310-023-00188-2
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    CEO compensation; Asymmetric compensation; Market risk; Corporate governance; Agency theory; Managerial power theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance

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