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The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on CEO Pay for Luck

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  • Teodora Paligorova

Abstract

According to the rent-extraction hypothesis, weak corporate governance allows entrenched CEOs to capture the pay-setting process and benefit from events outside of their control -- get paid for luck. In this paper, I find that the independence requirement imposed on boards of directors by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), together with the governance regulations subsequently introduced by stock exchanges, affects CEO pay structure. In firms whose corporate boards were originally less independent, and thus more affected by these provisions, CEO pay for performance strengthened while pay for luck decreased after adopting SOX. In contrast, those firms that exhibited strong board independence prior to SOX showed little evidence of pay for luck and little change in pay for performance following the adoption of SOX. The results are consistent with the rent-extraction hypothesis, and they are robust to alternative explanations such as asymmetric benchmarks, oligopoly, and managerial talent.

Suggested Citation

  • Teodora Paligorova, 2008. "The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on CEO Pay for Luck," Staff Working Papers 08-20, Bank of Canada.
  • Handle: RePEc:bca:bocawp:08-20
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    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Shenglan & Lin, Bingxuan & Lu, Rui & Zhang, Ting, 2015. "Controlling shareholders’ incentives and executive pay-for-performance sensitivity: Evidence from the split share structure reform in China," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 147-160.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Labour markets;

    JEL classification:

    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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