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Contractual Resolutions of Financial Distress

  • Nicola Gennaioli
  • Stefano Rossi

In a financial contracting model, we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress. We show that a debt structure where two distinct debt classes coexist--one class fully concentrated and with control rights upon default, the other dispersed and without control rights--removes the controlling creditor's liquidation bias when investor protection is strong. These results rationalize the use and the performance of floating charge financing, which refers to debt financing where the controlling creditor takes the entire business as collateral, in countries with strong investor protection. Our theory predicts that the efficiency of contractual resolutions of financial distress should increase with investor protection. The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhs129
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Article provided by Society for Financial Studies in its journal The Review of Financial Studies.

Volume (Year): 26 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 602-634

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Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:26:y:2013:i:3:p:602-634
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