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Contractual resolutions of financial distress

  • Nicola Gennaioli
  • Stefano Rossi

In a financial contracting model, we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress. We show that a debt structure where two distinct debt classes co-exist - one class fully concentrated and with control rights upon default, the other dispersed and without control rights - removes the controlling creditor's liquidation bias when investor protection is strong. These results rationalize the use and the performance of floating charge financing, debt financing where the controlling creditor takes the entire business as collateral, in countries with strong investor protection. Our theory predicts that the efficiency of contractual resolutions of financial distress should increase with investor protection.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 1316.

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Date of creation: Nov 2006
Date of revision: May 2012
Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:1316
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