IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/rfinst/v9y1996i4p1165-1210.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Control Rights, Debt Structure, and the Loss of Private Benefits: The Case of the U.K. Insolvency Code

Author

Listed:
  • Franks, Julian R
  • Nyborg, Kjell G

Abstract

We show how the efficiency of reorganization is affected by the distribution of control rights under the U.K. insolvency code. Control rights raise particular problems when creditors have different incentives to keep the firm as a going concern. Such differences may arise from the possession of private benefits by particular creditors which are lost if the debtor firm is liquidated. The incidence of inefficient liquidations is influenced by the size and seniority of creditors' claims. The current U.K. code is widely thought to give rise to inefficient liquidations. We show, however, that inefficiency depends upon the debt structure and whether the controlling creditor in formal bankruptcy has private benefits. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

Suggested Citation

  • Franks, Julian R & Nyborg, Kjell G, 1996. "Control Rights, Debt Structure, and the Loss of Private Benefits: The Case of the U.K. Insolvency Code," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 9(4), pages 1165-1210.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:9:y:1996:i:4:p:1165-1210
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.jstor.org/fcgi-bin/jstor/listjournal.fcg/08939454
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Calcagno, Riccardo & Renneboog, Luc, 2007. "The incentive to give incentives: On the relative seniority of debt claims and managerial compensation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 1795-1815, June.
    2. Calcagno, R. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2004. "Capital Structure and Managerial Compensation : The Effects of Renumeration Seniority," Discussion Paper 2004-120, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Nicola Gennaioli & Stefano Rossi, 2013. "Contractual Resolutions of Financial Distress," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(3), pages 602-634.
    4. Blazy, Regis & Chopard, Bertrand, 2004. "Ex post efficiency of bankruptcy procedures: A general normative framework," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 447-471, December.
    5. Benjamin, David, 2006. "Fast bargaining in bankruptcy," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 601, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    6. Gennaioli, Nicola & Rossi, Stefano, 2008. "Optimal Resolutions of Financial Distress by Contract," CEI Working Paper Series 2008-6, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    7. Hege, Ulrich, 2003. "Workouts, court-supervised reorganization and the choice between private and public debt," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 233-269, March.
    8. Anderson, Ronald W. & Nyborg, Kjell G., 2011. "Financing and corporate growth under repeated moral hazard," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-24, January.
    9. Chopard, Bertrand, 2004. "Enchères, redressement ou liquidation judiciaire," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 80(4), pages 655-669, Décembre.
    10. Stanley D. Longhofer & Stephen R. Peters, 2000. "Protection for whom? creditor conflicts in bankruptcy," Working Papers (Old Series) 9909R, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    11. Benjamin, David, 2006. "Fast bargaining in bankruptcy," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0601, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    12. Vincent Bignon & Guillaume Vuillemey, 2020. "The Failure of a Clearinghouse: Empirical Evidence [Counterparty risk externality: centralized versus over-the-counter markets]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 24(1), pages 99-128.
    13. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Simons, T. & Wright, M., 2005. "Leveraged Public to Private Transactions in the UK," Discussion Paper 2005-60, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    14. Eckbo, B. Espen & Thorburn, Karin S., 2004. "Bidding in mandatory bankruptcy auctions: Theory and evidence," Discussion Papers 2004/16, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    15. Erik Hofmann & Yannick Sertori, 2020. "Financial Spillover Effects in Supply Chains: Do Customers and Suppliers Really Benefit?," Logistics, MDPI, vol. 4(1), pages 1-27, March.
    16. Feldhütter, Peter & Hotchkiss, Edith & Karakaş, Oğuzhan, 2016. "The value of creditor control in corporate bonds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 1-27.
    17. Kazuo Ogawa & Elmer Sterken & Ichiro Tokutsu, 2013. "The trade credit channel revisited: evidence from micro data of Japanese small firms," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 101-118, January.
    18. Emilia Garcia‐Appendini & Judit Montoriol‐Garriga, 2020. "Trade Credit Use as Firms Approach Default," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(5), pages 1199-1229, August.
    19. Renneboog, Luc & Simons, Tomas & Wright, Mike, 2007. "Why do public firms go private in the UK? The impact of private equity investors, incentive realignment and undervaluation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 591-628, September.
    20. Francisco González, 2006. "Bank Equity Investments: Reducing Agency Costs or Buying Undervalued Firms? The Information Effects," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(1‐2), pages 284-304, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:9:y:1996:i:4:p:1165-1210. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sfsssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.