Control Rights, Debt Structure, and the Loss of Private Benefits: The Case of the U.K. Insolvency Code
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- Julian R Franks & Kjell G Nyborg, 1994. "Control Rights, Debt Structure, and the Loss of Private Benefits: The Case of the UK Insolvency Code," CEPR Financial Markets Paper 0047, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX..
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