The Failure of a Clearinghouse: Empirical Evidence
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Resolution Regimes for Central Clearing Parties
by Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz in Money, Banking and Financial Markets on 2017-10-09 18:02:53
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More about this item
KeywordsCCP; Central clearing; Collateral; Derivatives; Failure; Resolution;
- G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2016-12-04 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2016-12-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-HIS-2016-12-04 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-RMG-2016-12-04 (Risk Management)
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