Resolution of Failing Central Counterparties
In: Making Failure Feasible
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Resolution Regimes for Central Clearing Parties
by Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz in Money, Banking and Financial Markets on 2017-10-09 18:02:53
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Bignon, Vincent & Vuillemey, Guillaume, 2016. "The Failure of a Clearinghouse: Empirical Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 11630, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Walther, Ansgar & White, Lucy, 2019. "Rules versus Discretion in Bank Resolution," CEPR Discussion Papers 14048, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Berner, Richard & Cecchetti, Stephen G & Schoenholtz, Kermit, 2019.
"Stress Testing Networks: The Case of Central Counterparties,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
13604, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Richard B. Berner & Stephen G. Cecchetti & Kermit L. Schoenholtz, 2019. "Stress Testing Networks: The Case of Central Counterparties," NBER Working Papers 25686, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Boissel, Charles & Derrien, François & Ors, Evren & Thesmar, David, 2017.
"Systemic risk in clearing houses: Evidence from the European repo market,"
Journal of Financial Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 125(3), pages 511-536.
- Thesmar, David & Ors, Evren & Derrien, Francois & Boissel, Charles, 2015. "Systemic Risk in Clearing Houses: Evidence from the European Repo Market," HEC Research Papers Series 1112, HEC Paris.
- Charles Boissel & François Derrien & Evren Örs & David Thesmar, 2016. "Systemic risk in clearing houses: Evidence from the European repo market," ESRB Working Paper Series 10, European Systemic Risk Board.
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