IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

The Choice between Bank Debt and Trace Credit in Business Start-ups

  • Nancy Huyghebaert


  • Linda Gucht
  • Cynthia Hulle
Registered author(s):

    No abstract is available for this item.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Small Business Economics.

    Volume (Year): 29 (2007)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 435-452

    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:kap:sbusec:v:29:y:2007:i:4:p:435-452
    DOI: 10.1007/s11187-006-9005-2
    Contact details of provider: Web page:

    Order Information: Web:

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Brouwer, Maria & Hendrix, Bart, 1998. "Two Worlds of Venture Capital: What Happened to U.S. and Dutch Early Stage Investment?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 333-48, June.
    2. Mark S. Carey & Mitchell A. Post & Steven A. Sharpe, 1996. "Does corporate lending by banks and finance companies differ? Evidence on specialization in private debt contracting," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 96-25, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    3. Nancy Huyhebaert & Ann Gaeremynck & Filip Roodhooft & Linda M.. Van de Gucht, 2000. "New Firm Survival: The Effects of Start-up Characteristics," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(5&6), pages 627-651.
    4. Katzner, Donald W., 1992. "The structure of authority in the firm," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 41-67, September.
    5. Chemmanur, Thomas J & Fulghieri, Paolo, 1994. "Reputation, Renegotiation, and the Choice between Bank Loans and Publicly Traded Debt," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(3), pages 475-506.
    6. Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, 1996. "Trade Credit: Theories and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 5602, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Raymond Fisman & Inessa Love, 2002. "Trade Credit, Financial Intermediary Development and Industry Growth," NBER Working Papers 8960, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Chee K. Ng & Janet Kiholm Smith & Richard L. Smith, 1999. "Evidence on the Determinants of Credit Terms Used in Interfirm Trade," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(3), pages 1109-1129, 06.
    9. James S. Ang & Rebel A. Cole & James Wuh Lin, 2000. "Agency Costs and Ownership Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(1), pages 81-106, 02.
    10. Mueller, Elisabeth, 2005. "Benefits of Control, capital structure and company growth," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-55 [rev.], ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    11. Alan Schwartz, 1997. "Priority Contracts and Priority in Bankruptcy," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm72, Yale School of Management.
    12. Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1994. " The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(1), pages 3-37, March.
    13. Nicholas Wilson & Barbara Summers, 2002. "Trade Credit Terms Offered by Small Firms: Survey Evidence and Empirical Analysis," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(3&4), pages 317-351.
    14. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817, December.
    15. Repullo, R. & Suarez, J., 1996. "Monitoring, Liquidation, and Security Design," Papers 273, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi.
    16. Ooghe, Hubert & Manigart, Sophie & Fassin, Yves, 1991. "Growth patterns of the European venture capital industry," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 6(6), pages 381-404, November.
    17. Philippe Desbrières & Sophie Manigart & Koen De Waele & Mike Wright & Ken Robbie & Harry Sapienza & Amy Beekman, 1999. "Venture capitalists, investment appraisal and accounting information: a comparative study of the US, UK, France, Belgium and Holland," Working Papers CREGO 0991102, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    18. Mike Burkart & Tore Ellingsen, 2004. "In-Kind Finance: A Theory of Trade Credit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 569-590, June.
    19. Barton H. Hamilton, 2000. "Does Entrepreneurship Pay? An Empirical Analysis of the Returns to Self-Employment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(3), pages 604-631, June.
    20. Burkart, Mike & Ellingsen, Tore, 2002. "In-Kind Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers 3536, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    21. Harhoff, Dietmar & Stahl, Konrad & Woywode, Michael, 1998. "Legal Form, Growth and Exit of West German Firms--Empirical Results for Manufacturing, Construction, Trade and Service Industries," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(4), pages 453-88, December.
    22. Cook, Lisa D., 1999. "Trade credit and bank finance: Financing small firms in russia," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 14(5-6), pages 493-518.
    23. Michael Manove & A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1998. "Collateral vs. Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks," CSEF Working Papers 10, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    24. Manove, Michael & Padilla, A Jorge & Pagano, Marco, 2001. "Collateral versus Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(4), pages 726-44, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:sbusec:v:29:y:2007:i:4:p:435-452. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)

    or (Rebekah McClure)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.