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Benefits of Control, capital structure and company growth

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  • Mueller, Elisabeth

Abstract

This paper studies the influence of the benefits of control on the capital structure and the growth of private companies for a sample of 8,964 UK companies with limited liability observed for up to 5 years. It is hypothesised that companies in which existing owners would lose more control if they expanded, have smaller equity increases, are more highly levered and grow more slowly. Potential loss of control is measured as the difference in the probability of winning a vote for the largest owner before and after a hypothetical equity increase. Evidence is found that is consistent with the hypotheses.

Suggested Citation

  • Mueller, Elisabeth, 2005. "Benefits of Control, capital structure and company growth," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-55 [rev.], ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:5429
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mueller, Elisabeth & Zimmermann, Volker, 2006. "The Importance of Equity Finance for R&D Activity: Are There Differences Between Young and OldCompanies?," ZEW Discussion Papers 06-014, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    2. Myriam hernández-Robles & F. Javier Sánchez Vidal, 2014. "Conservadurismo financiero y creación de empleo," Economic Analysis Working Papers (2002-2010). Atlantic Review of Economics (2011-2016), Colexio de Economistas de A Coruña, Spain and Fundación Una Galicia Moderna, vol. 2, pages 1-1, December.
    3. Nancy Huyghebaert & Linda Gucht & Cynthia Hulle, 2007. "The Choice between Bank Debt and Trace Credit in Business Start-ups," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 435-452, December.
    4. Cécile Carpentier & Jean-François L’Her & Jean-Marc Suret, 2012. "Seasoned equity offerings by small and medium-sized enterprises," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 38(4), pages 449-465, May.
    5. Christina E. Bannier & Sabrina Zahn, 2014. "SMEs' Growth Heterogeneity - Evidence from Regional Developments," International Journal of Business Administration, International Journal of Business Administration, Sciedu Press, vol. 5(2), pages 23-49, March.
    6. Thomas Poulsen, 2013. "Corporate control and underinvestment," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 17(1), pages 131-155, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    benefits of control; capital structure; company growth; small and medium-sized enterprises;

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General

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