Bargaining Power and Value Sharing in Distribution Networks: A Cooperative Game Theory Approach
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- Roberto Roson & Franz Hubert, 2014. " Bargaining Power and Value Sharing in Distribution Networks: a Cooperative Game Theory Approach," Working Papers 2014:02, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Roberto Roson & Franz Hubert, 2014. "Bargaining Power and Value Sharing in Distribution Networks: A Cooperative Game Theory Approach," IEFE Working Papers 61, IEFE, Center for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
References listed on IDEAS
- Franz Hubert & Svetlana Ikonnikova, 2011.
"Investment Options And Bargaining Power: The Eurasian Supply Chain For Natural Gas,"
Journal of Industrial Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 85-116, March.
- Hubert, Franz & Ikonnikova, Svetlana, 2009. "Investment Options and Bargaining Power the Eurasian Supply Chain for Natural Gas," MPRA Paper 17854, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- repec:eee:eneeco:v:76:y:2018:i:c:p:170-185 is not listed on IDEAS
- Hubert Franz & Cobanli Onur, 2015.
"Pipeline Power: A Case Study of Strategic Network Investments,"
Review of Network Economics,
De Gruyter, vol. 14(2), pages 75-110, June.
- Cobanli, Onur & Hubert, Franz, 2014. "Pipeline Power: A Case Study of Strategic Network Investments," Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100596, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Jackson, Matthew O., 2005.
"Allocation rules for network games,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 128-154, April.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "Allocation Rules for Network Games," Working Papers 1160, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "Allocation Rules for Network Games," Working Papers 2003.51, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "Allocation Rules for Network Games," Game Theory and Information 0303010, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Stefano Moretti & Fioravante Patrone, 2008. "Rejoinder on: Transversality of the Shapley value," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 16(1), pages 60-61, July.
- Stefano Moretti & Fioravante Patrone, 2008. "Transversality of the Shapley value," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 16(1), pages 1-41, July.
- Franz Hubert & Onur Cobanli, 2012. "Pipeline Power," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1224, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
- Ekaterina Orlova & Franz Hubert, 2012. "Competition or Countervailing Power for the European Gas Market," EcoMod2012 4490, EcoMod.
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:48:y:1954:i:03:p:787-792_00 is not listed on IDEAS
- Orlova, Ekaterina & Hubert, Franz, 2014. "Network Access and Market Power," Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100474, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Balazs Sziklai & Laszlo A. Koczy & David Csercsik, 2018. "The geopolitical impact of Nord Stream 2," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1821, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
- Yu-Chung Tsao & Vu Thuy Linh, 2016. "Supply Chain Network Designs Developed for Deteriorating Items Under Conditions of Trade Credit and Partial Backordering," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 933-956, September.
- D'avid Csercsik & Franz Hubert & Bal'azs R. Sziklai & L'aszl'o 'A. K'oczy, 2019. "Modelling transfer profits as externalities in a cooperative game-theoretic model of natural gas networks," Papers 1901.11435, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2019.
- repec:ris:jspord:0941 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:kap:netspa:v:17:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s11067-017-9338-1 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
KeywordsNetwork markets; Cooperative games; Distribution networks; Bargaining;
- C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- L95 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Gas Utilities; Pipelines; Water Utilities
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