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Competition or Countervailing Power for the European Gas Market

Author

Listed:
  • Ekaterina Orlova
  • Franz Hubert

Abstract

For a long time European gas markets used to be dominated by `national champions', vertically integrated firms, controlling imports, transit lines and distribution networks. In its drive to create a common market, the EU commission is trying to overcome this fragmentation by liberalizing pipeline access, breaking up vertically integrated structures and fostering competition between the regions. However, critics argue that strong national players, or even a centralized gas policy, are needed to counter the power of a small number of external gas suppliers, such as Russia, Norway and Algeria, on which the EU depends to satisfy more than half of its consumption. We analyze two types of reforms. First, the enhancement of market integration by liberalizing access to the long distance transport system within the EU. Second, we analyze the effect of a centralization of EU gas policy. In this paper we analyze a disaggregated model of the European gas supply system as a cooperative game and use the Shapley value as a power index for the players. The starting point is a patchwork of local monopolies, each controlling both access to the distribution as well as to the transport network in its respective region. Our focus is on the distribution of power between regions within EU and outside producers and how it is affected by institutional reforms. By changing access rules we obtain a new game and analyze the impact of the reform. We find that the liberalization of access to the high pressure pipeline system within the EU, on balance, weakens the power of external suppliers and strengthens the regions within EU. But there is considerable variety on both sides of the market, which might explain the difficulties of implementing the reforms in the European context. We also analyze the effect of a centralization of EU gas policy. Centralized bargaining would benefit Europe mainly at the cost of Norway and Algeria, while the effects on Russia and transit countries like Ukraine are more ambiguous.

Suggested Citation

  • Ekaterina Orlova & Franz Hubert, 2012. "Competition or Countervailing Power for the European Gas Market," EcoMod2012 4490, EcoMod.
  • Handle: RePEc:ekd:002672:4490
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Franz Hubert & Svetlana Ikonnikova, 2011. "Investment Options And Bargaining Power: The Eurasian Supply Chain For Natural Gas," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 85-116, March.
    2. repec:aen:journl:2005v26-02-a03 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Inderst, Roman & Wey, Christian, 2003. "Bargaining, Mergers, and Technology Choice in Bilaterally Oligopolistic Industries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
    4. Irina Suleymanova & Franz Hubert, 2007. "Strategic Investment in International Gas-Transport Systems: A Dynamic Analysis of the Hold-up Problem," Energy and Environmental Modeling 2007 24000059, EcoMod.
    5. Henrick Horn & Asher Wolinsky, 1988. "Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 408-419, Autumn.
    6. repec:aen:journl:2004v25-03-a05 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Franz Hubert & Onur Cobanli, 2012. "Pipeline Power," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1224, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
    8. Christopher J. S. Gentle, 1996. "Europe in 2010," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: After Liberalisation, chapter 7, pages 121-132, Palgrave Macmillan.
    9. repec:aen:journl:1995v16-01-a06 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Oecd, 2010. "Energy Security and Competition Policy," OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy, OECD Publishing, vol. 11(1), pages 7-90.
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    Cited by:

    1. Roberto Roson & Franz Hubert, 2015. "Bargaining Power and Value Sharing in Distribution Networks: A Cooperative Game Theory Approach," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 71-87, March.
    2. Hubert Franz & Cobanli Onur, 2015. "Pipeline Power: A Case Study of Strategic Network Investments," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(2), pages 75-110, June.
    3. Hubert, Franz & Orlova, Ekaterina, 2018. "Network access and market power," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 170-185.
    4. Cobanli, Onur, 2014. "Central Asian gas in Eurasian power game," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 348-370.

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