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Transaction costs, opportunism, and governance: Contextual considerations and future research opportunities

  • Aric Rindfleisch

    ()

  • Kersi Antia
  • Janet Bercovitz
  • James Brown
  • Joseph Cannon
  • Stephen Carson
  • Mrinal Ghosh
  • Susan Helper
  • Diana Robertson
  • Kenneth Wathne

No abstract is available for this item.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11002-010-9104-3
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Marketing Letters.

Volume (Year): 21 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 211-222

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Handle: RePEc:kap:mktlet:v:21:y:2010:i:3:p:211-222
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100312

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  1. Erin Anderson, 1985. "The Salesperson as Outside Agent or Employee: A Transaction Cost Analysis," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 4(3), pages 234-254.
  2. Ulset, Svein, 1996. "R&D outsourcing and contractual governance: An empirical study of commercial R&D projects," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 63-82, July.
  3. Sandy D. Jap & Erin Anderson, 2003. "Safeguarding Interorganizational Performance and Continuity Under Ex Post Opportunism," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(12), pages 1684-1701, December.
  4. Williamson, Oliver E., 1999. "The Mechanisms of Governance," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195132601.
  5. Given, Jock, 2007. "The wealth of networks: How social production transforms markets and freedom," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 278-282, June.
  6. Commons, John R., 1931. "Institutional Economics," History of Economic Thought Articles, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, vol. 21, pages 648-657.
  7. Helper, Susan & Levine, David I, 1992. "Long-Term Supplier Relations and Product-Market Structure," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(3), pages 561-81, October.
  8. Macher Jeffrey T & Richman Barak D, 2008. "Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-65, May.
  9. Deeds, David L. & Hill, Charles W. L., 1999. "An examination of opportunistic action within research alliances: Evidence from the biotechnology industry," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 141-163, March.
  10. Rachelle C. Sampson, 2004. "The Cost of Misaligned Governance in R&D Alliances," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(2), pages 484-526, October.
  11. Hoetker, Glenn, 2002. "Do Modular Products Lead to Modular Organizations?," Working Papers 02-0130, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
  12. Anderson, Erin, 1988. "Transaction costs as determinants of opportunism in integrated and independent sales forces," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 247-264, April.
  13. Yadong Luo, 2007. "An integrated anti-opportunism system in international exchange," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 38(6), pages 855-877, November.
  14. Oliver E. Williamson, 2000. "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(3), pages 595-613, September.
  15. Michael D. Ryall & Rachelle C. Sampson, 2009. "Formal Contracts in the Presence of Relational Enforcement Mechanisms: Evidence from Technology Development Projects," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(6), pages 906-925, June.
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