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Capital-accumulation games under environmental regulation and duopolistic competition

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  • Martina Stimming

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  • Martina Stimming, 1999. "Capital-accumulation games under environmental regulation and duopolistic competition," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 69(3), pages 267-287, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:69:y:1999:i:3:p:267-287
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01231162
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    1. Kort, Peter, 1994. "Effects of pollution restrictions on dynamic investment policy of a firm," Other publications TiSEM 65070652-3cbe-4f8c-a6a6-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Michael L. Katz & Harvey S. Rosen, 1985. "Tax Analysis in an Oligopoly Model," Public Finance Review, , vol. 13(1), pages 3-20, January.
    3. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1992. "Environmental policy, adjustment costs, and behavior of the firm," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 258-275, November.
    4. Levin, Dan, 1985. "Taxation within Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 281-290, August.
    5. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
    6. Feenstra, T.L. & Kort, P.M. & Verheijen, P.A. & de Zeeuw, A.J., 1996. "Standards versus taxes in a dynamic duopoly model of trade," Other publications TiSEM cbdf7273-871d-4baa-8b6a-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Hoel, Michael, 1991. "Global environmental problems: The effects of unilateral actions taken by one country," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
    8. Pindyck, Robert S, 1991. "Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 29(3), pages 1110-1148, September.
    9. R. Simpson, 1995. "Optimal pollution taxation in a Cournot duopoly," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 6(4), pages 359-369, December.
    10. Fershtman, Chaim & Muller, Eitan, 1984. "Capital accumulation games of infinite duration," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 322-339, August.
    11. Kopp, Raymond J. & Smith, V. Kerry, 1980. "Environmental regulation and optimal investment behavior : A micro-economic analysis," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 211-224, June.
    12. Feenstra, T.L. & Kort, P.M. & de Zeeuw, A.J., 1997. "Environmental Policy in an International Duopoly : An Analysis of Feedback Investment Strategies," Other publications TiSEM aa85bfe9-4670-4386-8154-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    13. Dierickx, I. & Matutes, C. & Neven, D., 1988. "Indirect taxation and cournot equilibrium," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 385-399.
    14. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1992. "The international dimension of environmental policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 379-387, April.
    15. Feenstra, Talitha & Kort, Peter M. & de Zeeuw, Aart, 2001. "Environmental policy instruments in an international duopoly with feedback investment strategies," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(10), pages 1665-1687, October.
    16. Dockner Engelbert J. & Van Long Ngo, 1993. "International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 13-29, July.
    17. Katsoulacos, Yannis & Xepapadeas, Anastasios, 1994. "Environmental Policy Under Oligopoly with Endogenous Market Structure," CEPR Discussion Papers 955, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. J. P. Gould, 1968. "Adjustment Costs in the Theory of Investment of the Firm," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 35(1), pages 47-55.
    19. Till Requate, 1993. "Pollution control in a Cournot duopoly via taxes or permits," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 255-291, October.
    20. Okuguchi, Koji, 1993. "Unified approach to Cournot models : Oligopoly, taxation and aggregate provision of a pure public good," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 233-245, May.
    21. John Pezzey, 1992. "Analysis of Unilateral CO2 Control in the European Community and OECD," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 159-172.
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    Cited by:

    1. Martín-Herrán, Guiomar & Rubio, Santiago J., 2021. "On coincidence of feedback and global Stackelberg equilibria in a class of differential games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 293(2), pages 761-772.
    2. Dongdong Li, 2022. "Dynamic optimal control of firms' green innovation investment and pricing strategies with environmental awareness and emission tax," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(4), pages 920-932, June.
    3. Requate, Till, 2005. "Environmental Policy under Imperfect Competition: A Survey," Economics Working Papers 2005-12, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    differential game; investment; pollution; emission taxes; tradeable emission permits; open-loop Nash equilibria; duopolistic competition; C73; D92; L11; L13; Q25; Q28;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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