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A reassessment of the potential for loss-framed incentive contracts to increase productivity: a meta-analysis and a real-effort experiment

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  • Paul J. Ferraro

    (Johns Hopkins University)

  • J. Dustin Tracy

    (Chapman University)

Abstract

Substantial productivity increases have been reported when incentives are framed as losses rather than gains. Loss-framed contracts have also been reported to be preferred by workers. The results from our meta-analysis and real-effort experiment challenge these claims. The meta-analysis’ summary effect size of loss framing is a 0.16 SD increase in productivity. Whereas the summary effect size in laboratory experiments is a 0.33 SD, the summary effect size from field experiments is 0.02 SD. We detect evidence of publication biases among laboratory experiments. In a new laboratory experiment that addresses prior design weaknesses, we estimate an effect size of 0.12 SD. This result, in combination with the meta-analysis, suggests that the difference between the effect size estimates in laboratory and field experiments does not stem from the limited external validity of laboratory experiments, but may instead stem from a mix of underpowered laboratory designs and publication biases. Moreover, in our experiment, most workers preferred the gain-framed contract and the increase in average productivity is only detectable in the subgroup of workers (~ 20%) who preferred the loss-framed contracts. Based on the results from our experiment and meta-analysis, we believe that behavioral scientists should better assess preferences for loss-framed contracts and the magnitude of their effects on productivity before advocating for greater use of such contracts among private and public sector actors.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul J. Ferraro & J. Dustin Tracy, 2022. "A reassessment of the potential for loss-framed incentive contracts to increase productivity: a meta-analysis and a real-effort experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(5), pages 1441-1466, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:25:y:2022:i:5:d:10.1007_s10683-022-09754-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09754-x
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    1. Beam, Emily A. & Masatioglu, Yusufcan & Watson, Tara & Yang, Dean, 2023. "Loss aversion or lack of trust: Why does loss framing work to encourage preventive health behaviors?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 104(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Framing effects; Incentive contracts; Meta-analysis; Real-effort experiment; Behavioral insights;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

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