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Bonus and penalty incentives contract choice by employees

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  • Luft, Joan

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  • Luft, Joan, 1994. "Bonus and penalty incentives contract choice by employees," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 181-206, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:18:y:1994:i:2:p:181-206
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. de Quidt, Jonathan, 2014. "Your loss is my gain: a recruitment experiment with framed incentives," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58208, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Dennis Dittrich & Martin Kocher, 2006. "Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-23, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    3. Lazzarini, Sergio G. & Islam, Gazi & Mesquita, Luiz F., 2008. "Self-interest and organizational performance: an empirical examination with U.S. and Brazilian managers," Insper Working Papers wpe_154, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
    4. Bonner, Sarah E. & Sprinkle, Geoffrey B., 2002. "The effects of monetary incentives on effort and task performance: theories, evidence, and a framework for research," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 27(4-5), pages 303-345.
    5. Olivier Armantier & Amadou Boly, 2014. "On the effects of incentive framing on bribery: evidence from an experiment in Burkina Faso," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 1-15, February.
    6. Merchant, Kenneth A. & Van der Stede, Wim A. & Zheng, Liu, 2003. "Disciplinary constraints on the advancement of knowledge: the case of organizational incentive systems," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 28(2-3), pages 251-286.
    7. Demi Chung & David A. Hensher, 2015. "Modelling Risk Perceptions of Stakeholders in Public–Private Partnership Toll Road Contracts," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 51(3), pages 437-483, September.
    8. Birnberg, Jacob G. & Hoffman, Vicky B. & Yuen, Susana, 2008. "The accountability demand for information in China and the US - A research note," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 20-32, January.
    9. Ivo Schedlinsky & Friedrich Sommer & Arnt Wöhrmann, 2016. "Risk-taking in tournaments: an experimental analysis," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 86(8), pages 837-866, November.
    10. Schiffels, Sebastian & Fügener, Andreas & Kolisch, Rainer & Jens Brunner, O., 2014. "On the assessment of costs in a newsvendor environment: Insights from an experimental study," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 1-8.
    11. Peecher, Mark E. & Solomon, Ira & Trotman, Ken T., 2013. "An accountability framework for financial statement auditors and related research questions," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 38(8), pages 596-620.
    12. Buchheit, Steve, 2003. "Reporting the cost of capacity," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 549-565, August.
    13. Cardinaels, Eddy, 2008. "The interplay between cost accounting knowledge and presentation formats in cost-based decision-making," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 582-602, August.
    14. de Quidt, Jonathan, 2014. "Your loss is my gain: a recruitment experiment with framed incentives," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58208, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    15. Brown, Jason L. & Farrington, Sukari & Sprinkle, Geoffrey B., 2016. "Biased self-assessments, feedback, and employees' compensation plan choices," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 45-59.
    16. repec:eee:aosoci:v:65:y:2018:i:c:p:20-32 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Essl, Andrea & Jaussi, Stefanie, 2017. "Choking under time pressure: The influence of deadline-dependent bonus and malus incentive schemes on performance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 127-137.
    18. W. Ekins & Andrew Brooks & Gregory Berns, 2014. "The neural correlates of contractual risk and penalty framing," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 49(2), pages 125-140, October.
    19. Fisher, Joseph G. & Frederickson, James R. & Peffer, Sean A., 2006. "Budget negotiations in multi-period settings," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 511-528, August.
    20. Alex Imas & Sally Sadoff & Anya Samek, 2015. "Do People Anticipate Loss Aversion?," CESifo Working Paper Series 5277, CESifo Group Munich.
    21. Daniele Nosenzo, 2016. "Employee incentives: Bonuses or penalties?," IZA World of Labor, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), pages 234-234, January.
    22. K. Hilken & S. Rosenkranz & K.J.M. De Jaegher & M. Jegers, 2013. "Reference Points, Performance and Ability: A Real Effort Experiment on Framed Incentive Schemes," Working Papers 13-15, Utrecht School of Economics.
    23. Dittrich, Dennis & Kocher, Martin, 2006. "Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee under Endogenous Supervision," CEPR Discussion Papers 5962, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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