IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Is the Experimental Auction a Dynamic Market?

  • Jay Corrigan

    ()

Experimental auctions are generally thought of as static markets. This paper presents the results of an experimental auction designed to test whether participants’ perceptions regarding the relative difficulty of delaying or reversing a transaction outside the experimental market systematically affect their willingness-to-pay bids. The results show that auction participants’ perceptions significantly impact their bids in a manner that is consistent with real option theory. These results suggest that economists must be careful to consider the existence of outside markets when designing experimental auctions. Copyright Springer 2005

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10640-004-6981-z
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Springer & European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental & Resource Economics.

Volume (Year): 31 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (05)
Pages: 35-45

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:31:y:2005:i:1:p:35-45
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

Postal:

c/o EAERE Secretariat - Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei - Isola di San Giorgio Maggiore 8, I-30124 Venice, Italy

Phone: +39.041.2700438
Fax: +39.041.2700412
Web page: http://www.eaere.org/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/environmental/journal/10640/PS2

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Jayson L. Lusk & John A. Fox & Ted C. Schroeder & James Mintert & Mohammad Koohmaraie, 2001. "In-Store Valuation of Steak Tenderness," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 83(3), pages 539-550.
  2. Hayes, Dermot J. & Shogren, Jason F. & Shin, Seung Youll & Kliebenstein, James, 1995. "Valuing Food Safety in Experimental Auction Markets," Staff General Research Papers Archive 835, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  3. Zhao, Jinhua & Kling, Catherine L., 2004. "Willingness-To-Pay, Compensating Variation, and the Cost of Commitment," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1875, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  4. Harrison, Glen W. & Ronald M. Harstad & E. Elisabet Rutström, 1995. "Experimental Methods and Elicitation of Values," Discussion Paper Serie B 349, University of Bonn, Germany.
  5. Cannon Koo & Jason Shogren & John List & Michael Margolis, 2001. "A random nth-price auction," Artefactual Field Experiments 00517, The Field Experiments Website.
  6. Davis, Douglas D & Williams, Arlington W, 1991. "The Hayek Hypothesis in Experimental Auctions: Institutional Effects and Market Power," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(2), pages 261-74, April.
  7. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard H, 1990. "Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1325-48, December.
  8. Dermot Hayes & Jason Shogren & John List, 2000. "Preference Learning in Consecutive Experimental Auctions," Artefactual Field Experiments 00519, The Field Experiments Website.
  9. Jayson Lusk & Ted Schroeder & Ty Feldkamp, 2004. "Experimental auction procedure: Impact on valuation of quality differentiated goods," Artefactual Field Experiments 00097, The Field Experiments Website.
  10. Harrison, Glenn W, 1992. "Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1426-43, December.
  11. Don L. Coursey & John L. Hovis & William D. Schulze, 1987. "The Disparity Between Willingness to Accept and Willingness to Pay Measures of Value," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(3), pages 679-690.
  12. Shogren, Jason F. & Shin, Seung Youll & Hayes, Dermot J. & Kliebenstein, James, 1994. "Resolving Differences in Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept," Staff General Research Papers Archive 701, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  13. Matthew Rousu & Wallace E. Huffman & Jason F. Shogren & Abebayehu Tegene, 2004. "Are United States Consumers Tolerant of Genetically Modified Foods?," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 26(1), pages 19-31.
  14. Jay R. Corrigan & Matthew C. Rousu, 2006. "The Effect of Initial Endowments in Experimental Auctions," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 88(2), pages 448-457.
  15. Shogren, Jason F. & Crocker, Thomas D., 1994. "Rational risk valuation given sequential reduction opportunities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 241-248.
  16. Kolstad, Charles D. & Guzman, Rolando M., 1999. "Information and the Divergence between Willingness to Accept and Willingness to Pay," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 66-80, July.
  17. Charles Noussair & StÈphane Robin & Bernard Ruffieux, 2004. "Do Consumers Really Refuse To Buy Genetically Modified Food?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(492), pages 102-120, 01.
  18. Elizabeth Hoffman & Dale J. Menkhaus & Dipankar Chakravarti & Ray A. Field & Glen D. Whipple, 1993. "Using Laboratory Experimental Auctions in Marketing Research: A Case Study of New Packaging for Fresh Beef," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 12(3), pages 318-338.
  19. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, 03.
  20. Jayson L. Lusk, 2003. "An Experimental Test of the Commitment Cost Theory," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1316-1322.
  21. Noussair, C. & Robin, S. & Ruffieux, B., 2001. "Do Consumers Not Care about Biotech Foods or Do They Just Not Read the Labels?," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1142, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  22. Matthew C. Rousu & Wallace E. Huffman & Jason F. Shogren & Abebayehu Tegene, 2004. "Estimating the Public Value of Conflicting Information: The Case of Genetically Modified Foods," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 80(1), pages 125-135.
  23. Fox, John A. & Hayes, Dermot J. & Shogren, Jason F., 2002. "Consumer Preferences for Food Irradiation: How Favorable and Unfavorable Descriptions Affect Preferences for Irradiated Pork in Experimental Auctions," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5207, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  24. Zhao, Jinhua & Kling, Catherine L., 2001. "A new explanation for the WTP/WTA disparity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 293-300, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:31:y:2005:i:1:p:35-45. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)

or (Rebekah McClure)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.