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Efectos externos del endeudamiento sobre la calificación crediticia de las Comunidades Autónomas

  • Andrés Leal Marcos

    ()

    (Gobierno de Aragón)

  • Julio López Laborda

    ()

    (Universidad de Zaragoza)

The aim of this paper is to obtain empirical evidence about the influence of the public debt externalities of the central and regional governments have on the credit rating of the Spanish Autonomous Communities. The analysis was done by estimating an ordered probit model from panel data for the Autonomous Communities during the period 1992-2007. The results show that the level of indebtedness of the own regional government, as well as the stock of debt of the regional level and central government, have a significant impact on the probability of obtaining a particular rating.

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Article provided by IEF in its journal Hacienda Pública Española/Revista de Economía Pública.

Volume (Year): 189 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 81-106

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Handle: RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2009:v:189:i:2:p:81-106
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