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Implementing the stability and growth pact: enforcement and procedural flexibility

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Abstract

The paper proposes a theoretical analysis illustrating some key policy trade-offs involved in the implementation of a rules-based fiscal framework reminiscent of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The analysis offers some insights on the current debate about the SGP. Specifically, greater "procedural" flexibility in the implementation of existing rules may improve welfare, thus increasing the Pact's political acceptability. Here, procedural flexibility designates the enforcer's room to apply well-informed judgment on the basis of underlying policies and to set a consolidation path that does not discourage high-quality policy measures. Yet budgetary opaqueness may hinder the qualitative assessment of fiscal policy, possibly destroying the case for flexibility. Also, improved budget monitoring and greater transparency increase the benefits from greater procedural flexibility. Overall, we establish that a fiscal pact based on a simple deficit rule with conditional procedural flexibility can simultaneously contain excessive deficits, lower unproductive spending and increase high-quality outlays. JEL Classification: E62, H6

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  • Beetsma, Roel & Debrun, Xavier, 2005. "Implementing the stability and growth pact: enforcement and procedural flexibility," Working Paper Series 433, European Central Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:2005433
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    Cited by:

    1. Fiorella Kostoris Padoa Schioppa, 2006. "The 2005 Reform of the Stability and Growth Pact: Too Little, Too Late?," Bruges European Economic Research Papers 6, European Economic Studies Department, College of Europe.
    2. Juergen von Hagen, 2010. "The Sustainability of Public Finanaces and Fiscal Policy Coordination in the EMU," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 412, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
    3. Julia del Amo Valor & Marcos Martín Mateos & Diego Martínez López & Javier J. Pérez, 2023. "Is the European economic governance framework too “complex”? A critical discussion," Working Papers 2023-06, FEDEA.
    4. repec:ilo:ilowps:388773 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Schuknecht, Ludger, 2004. "EU fiscal rules: issues and lessons from political economy," Working Paper Series 421, European Central Bank.
    6. Cezara Vinturis, 2023. "How do fiscal rules shape governments' spending behavior?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(2), pages 322-341, April.
    7. Sajedi, Rana, 2018. "Fiscal consequences of structural reform under constrained monetary policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 22-38.
    8. Hoeven, Rolph van der. & Lübker, Malte., 2006. "Financial openness and employment the need for coherent international and national policies," ILO Working Papers 993887733402676, International Labour Organization.
    9. Kady Keita & Camelia Turcu, 2023. "Promoting Counter-Cyclical Fiscal Policy: Fiscal Rules Versus Institutions," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 65(4), pages 736-781, December.
    10. International Monetary Fund, 2006. "Bosnia and Herzegovina: Selected Issues," IMF Staff Country Reports 2006/368, International Monetary Fund.
    11. James Hollyer, 2010. "Conditionality, compliance, and domestic interests: State capture and EU accession policy," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 387-431, December.
    12. Wyplosz, Charles & Krogstrup, Signe, 2006. "A Common Pool Theory of Deficit Bias Correction," CEPR Discussion Papers 5866, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Krogstrup, Signe & Wyplosz, Charles, 2010. "A common pool theory of supranational deficit ceilings," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 269-278, February.
    14. Andrés Leal Marcos & Julio López Laborda, 2009. "Efectos externos del endeudamiento sobre la calificación crediticia de las Comunidades Autónomas," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 189(2), pages 81-106, June.
    15. Paolo Biraschi, "undated". "Searching for the optimal EMU fiscal rule:an ex-post analysis of the SGP reform proposals," Working Papers wp2008-7, Department of the Treasury, Ministry of the Economy and of Finance.
    16. Esposito, Piero & Paradiso, Antonio & Rao, B. Bhaskara, 2011. "The dynamics of Spanish public debt and sustainable paths for fiscal consolidation," MPRA Paper 32563, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Paweł Młodkowski, 2006. "Konwergencja fiskalna w uniach walutowych w Afryce na tle rozwiązań europejskich," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 1-2, pages 19-36.
    18. Bergman, U. Michael & Hutchison, Michael M. & Jensen, Svend E. Hougaard, 2016. "Promoting sustainable public finances in the European Union: The role of fiscal rules and government efficiency," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 1-19.
    19. Carlo Panico & Francesco Purificato, 2012. "The Role of Institutional and Political Factors in the European Debt Crisis," Working Papers wp280, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    deficits; fiscal rules; procedural flexibility; Stability and Growth Pact; structural reforms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General

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