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Conditionality, compliance, and domestic interests: State capture and EU accession policy

  • James Hollyer

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11558-010-9085-2
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    Article provided by Springer in its journal The Review of International Organizations.

    Volume (Year): 5 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 387-431

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:4:p:387-431
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com/business/sociology/journal/11558

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    1. Sergei Guriev & Andrei Rachinsky, 2005. "The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/1cu21pio6c9, Sciences Po.
    2. James Vreeland, 2006. "IMF program compliance: Aggregate index versus policy specific research strategies," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 359-378, December.
    3. Dreher, Axel, 2006. "IMF and economic growth: The effects of programs, loans, and compliance with conditionality," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 769-788, May.
    4. Wolfgang Mayer & Alexandros Mourmouras, 2005. "The Political Economy of IMF Conditionality: A Common Agency Model," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(4), pages 449-466, November.
    5. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
    6. Marco Buti & Sylvester Eijffinger & Daniele Franco, 2003. "Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: grand design or internal adjustment?," European Economy - Economic Papers 180, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    7. Beetsma, Roel & Debrun, Xavier, 2005. "Implementing the stability and growth pact: enforcement and procedural flexibility," Working Paper Series 0433, European Central Bank.
    8. Geoffrey Pridham, 2008. "The EU's Political Conditionality and Post-Accession Tendencies: Comparisons from Slovakia and Latvia," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46, pages 365-387, 03.
    9. Alberto Alesina & Allan Drazen, 1989. "Why are Stabilizations Delayed?," NBER Working Papers 3053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Bombardini, Matilde, 2008. "Firm heterogeneity and lobby participation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 329-348, July.
    11. Ai, Chunrong & Norton, Edward C., 2003. "Interaction terms in logit and probit models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 123-129, July.
    12. Devashish Mitra, 1999. "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1116-1134, December.
    13. Bombardini, Matilde & Trebbi, Francesco, 2012. "Competition and political organization: Together or alone in lobbying for trade policy?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 18-26.
    14. Pecorino, Paul, 2001. " Market Structure, Tariff Lobbying and the Free-Rider Problem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 106(3-4), pages 203-20, March.
    15. Dimitrova, Antoaneta & Toshkov, Dimiter, 2009. "Post-accession compliance between administrative co-ordination and political bargaining," European Integration online Papers (EIoP), European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A), vol. 13, December.
    16. Micahael Tomz & Jason Wittenberg & Gary King, . "Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results," Journal of Statistical Software, American Statistical Association, vol. 8(i01).
    17. Beck, Nathaniel & Katz, Jonathan N., . "Modeling dynamics in time-series-cross-section political economy data," Working Papers 1304, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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