Talent management and career development: What it takes to get promoted
Based on the talent management literature, this paper investigates managerial skills that are essential for managers’ job promotion. Using arguments from the human and social capital literature and following tournament logic, we claim that a manager's own experience, expertise, and network size positively affect promotion odds, while strong colleagues decrease promotion odds. Studying 7003 promotions to middle management and 3147 promotions to senior management, we find broad support for our hypotheses, but find also that network size no longer predicts promotion to senior management. Our findings have implications for individual career development and talent management programs.
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Volume (Year): 49 (2014)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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