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Reaching agreement on contribution behavior in different cultures-a public goods game with representatives in Japan and Germany

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  • Isaak, Andrew
  • Schwieren, Christiane
  • Iida, Yoshio

Abstract

We discuss the results of an experimental public good game with group representatives in Germany and Japan, societies with varying levels of individualism. Representatives are permitted to communicate with their constituencies, but not with other representatives. We focus on accountability between representative and his constituency and on the risk taken in the interaction between representatives. We find that in Germany, subjects more readily trust a stranger's cooperativeness, groups reach agreement faster and are quicker to discuss and formulate a strategy in pre-play communication vis-a-vis Japanese subjects, where group formation takes longer. Further, we find a stronger end effect in Germany than in Japan, where the period of play explains much less variance in contribution behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Isaak, Andrew & Schwieren, Christiane & Iida, Yoshio, 2022. "Reaching agreement on contribution behavior in different cultures-a public goods game with representatives in Japan and Germany," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:99:y:2022:i:c:s2214804322000684
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2022.101894
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public goods; Negotiation; Decision-making; Communication; Culture; Experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination

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