Effective and efficient experimental instructions
We treat instructions as an experimental variable to study how their format affects the participants’ comprehension, speed of play, and experimental behavior. We find that, in a public good game, short on-screen instructions requiring forced inputs improve on subjects’ comprehension and familiarity with the experimental task. They also contribute to reduce both decision and waiting times without affecting the overall pattern of contributions.
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