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Variation in experimental instructions: Punishment in public goods games

Author

Listed:
  • Abhijit Ramalingam

    (University of East Anglia)

  • Antonio J. Morales

    (Universidad de Malaga)

  • James M. Walker

    (Indiana University)

Abstract

We provide evidence that more explicit, and hence longer, instructions can affect behaviour in a public goods game with punishment. Instructions that highlight the positive externality associated with public goods contributions, provide more examples, and emphasize fundamental aspects of the decision setting are associated with higher contribution levels in games with punishment opportunities when compared to shorter, less explicit instructions. These changes are not found to impact behaviour in the simpler contribution game without punishment.

Suggested Citation

  • Abhijit Ramalingam & Antonio J. Morales & James M. Walker, 2016. "Variation in experimental instructions: Punishment in public goods games," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 15-22R, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    • Handle: RePEc:uea:wcbess:15-22
    as

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    File URL: https://www.uea.ac.uk/documents/166500/205758/CBESS+15-22R.pdf/ef21bd13-892a-4860-8b90-331f3472d465
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ananish Chaudhuri, 2011. "Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(1), pages 47-83, March.
    2. Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
    3. Bigoni, M. & Dragone, D., 2012. "Effective and efficient experimental instructions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 460-463.
    4. Ramalingam, Abhijit & Godoy, Sara & Morales, Antonio J. & Walker, James M., 2016. "An individualistic approach to institution formation in public good games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 18-36.
    5. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Abhijit Ramalingam & Antonio J. Morales & James M. Walker, 2016. "Peer sanctioning in isomorphic provision and appropriation social dilemmas," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 16-09, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    2. Abhijit Ramalingam & Antonio J. Morales & James M. Walker, 2017. "Peer sanctioning in isomorphic provision and appropriation social dilemmas," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 16-09R, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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