IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/riibaf/v64y2023ics0275531922002471.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Terrorist attacks and CEO compensation: UK evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Huang, Wenxuan
  • Xu, Weidong
  • Gao, Xin
  • Li, Donghui
  • Fu, Wentao

Abstract

This paper shows that both CEO compensation and rank-and-file employee compensation rise after terrorist attacks by employing a sample of 2558 firms in the UK from 1999 to 2018. The structure of CEO compensation growth differs in accordance with different cutoffs. Further analyses show that media coverage and CEO bargaining power accentuate the effect of terrorist attacks on CEO compensation and rank-and-file employee compensation, and the impact of media is mainly based on the information dissemination function. Our results remain valid after taking into account various robustness tests and endogeneity concerns.

Suggested Citation

  • Huang, Wenxuan & Xu, Weidong & Gao, Xin & Li, Donghui & Fu, Wentao, 2023. "Terrorist attacks and CEO compensation: UK evidence," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:64:y:2023:i:c:s0275531922002471
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2022.101861
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0275531922002471
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.ribaf.2022.101861?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Raja, Usman & Azeem, Muhammad Umer & Haq, Inam Ul & Naseer, Saima, 2020. "Perceived threat of terrorism and employee outcomes: The moderating role of negative affectivity and psychological capital," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 316-326.
    2. Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, 2008. "Why has CEO Pay Increased So Much?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(1), pages 49-100.
    3. Joel Peress, 2014. "The Media and the Diffusion of Information in Financial Markets: Evidence from Newspaper Strikes," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(5), pages 2007-2043, October.
    4. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Fried, Jesse & Walker, David I, 2002. "Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation," CEPR Discussion Papers 3558, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Yermack, David, 1998. "Companies' Modest Claims about the Value of CEO Stock Option Awards," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 207-226, March.
    6. Kenneth R. Ahern, 2018. "The Importance of Psychology in Economic Activity: Evidence from Terrorist Attacks," NBER Working Papers 24331, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Michael K. Bednar & Steven Boivie & Nicholas R. Prince, 2013. "Burr Under the Saddle: How Media Coverage Influences Strategic Change," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 24(3), pages 910-925, June.
    8. Henrik Cronqvist & Fredrik Heyman & Mattias Nilsson & Helena Svaleryd & Jonas Vlachos, 2009. "Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(1), pages 309-339, February.
    9. Florian S. Peters & Alexander F. Wagner, 2014. "The Executive Turnover Risk Premium," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(4), pages 1529-1563, August.
    10. Hirshleifer, David & Teoh, Siew Hong, 2003. "Limited attention, information disclosure, and financial reporting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1-3), pages 337-386, December.
    11. Heli Wang & Shan Zhao & Guoli Chen, 2017. "Firm-specific knowledge assets and employment arrangements: Evidence from CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(9), pages 1875-1894, September.
    12. Jingoo Kang & Andy Y. Han Kim, 2017. "The Relationship Between CEO Media Appearances and Compensation," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(3), pages 379-394, June.
    13. Blanchflower, David G. & Bryson, Alex, 2008. "Union decline in Britain," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19603, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    14. Gilson, Stuart C., 1989. "Management turnover and financial distress," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 241-262, December.
    15. Klein, April, 1998. "Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 275-303, April.
    16. Jesper Haga & Fredrik Huhtamäki & Dennis Sundvik, 2022. "Ruthless Exploiters or Ethical Guardians of the Workforce? Powerful CEOs and their Impact on Workplace Safety and Health," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 177(3), pages 641-663, May.
    17. Yugang Yin & Bin Tan, 2017. "Analyst’s ability, media selection and investor interests: evidence from China," China Finance Review International, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 7(1), pages 67-84, February.
    18. Niederhoffer, Victor, 1971. "The Analysis of World Events and Stock Prices," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(2), pages 193-219, April.
    19. Core, John E. & Guay, Wayne & Larcker, David F., 2008. "The power of the pen and executive compensation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 1-25, April.
    20. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 2013. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Leonard C MacLean & William T Ziemba (ed.), HANDBOOK OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING Part I, chapter 6, pages 99-127, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    21. Lili Dai & Jerry T. Parwada & Bohui Zhang, 2015. "The Governance Effect of the Media's News Dissemination Role: Evidence from Insider Trading," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(2), pages 331-366, May.
    22. Eckstein, Zvi & Tsiddon, Daniel, 2004. "Macroeconomic consequences of terror: theory and the case of Israel," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(5), pages 971-1002, July.
    23. Inam Ul Haq & Usman Raja & Muhammad Umer Azeem & Saima Naseer, 2020. "Perceived threat of terrorism and employee outcomes: The moderating role of negative affectivity and psychological capital," Post-Print hal-03395416, HAL.
    24. Bang Dang Nguyen, 2015. "Is More News Good News? Media Coverage of CEOs, Firm Value, and Rent Extraction," Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(04), pages 1-38, December.
    25. Stefano Dellavigna & Joshua M. Pollet, 2009. "Investor Inattention and Friday Earnings Announcements," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(2), pages 709-749, April.
    26. Maarten J. Voors & Eleonora E. M. Nillesen & Philip Verwimp & Erwin H. Bulte & Robert Lensink & Daan P. Van Soest, 2012. "Violent Conflict and Behavior: A Field Experiment in Burundi," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 941-964, April.
    27. Hyunseob Kim & Howard Kung, 2017. "The Asset Redeployability Channel: How Uncertainty Affects Corporate Investment," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 30(1), pages 245-280.
    28. Dirk Brounen & Jeroen Derwall, 2010. "The Impact of Terrorist Attacks on International Stock Markets," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 16(4), pages 585-598, September.
    29. Laura L. Veldkamp, 2006. "Media Frenzies in Markets for Financial Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 577-601, June.
    30. JP Vergne & Georg Wernicke & Steffen Brenner, 2018. "Signal Incongruence and Its Consequences: A Study of Media Disapproval and CEO Overcompensation," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(5), pages 796-817, October.
    31. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2003. "Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(5), pages 1043-1075, October.
    32. Jennifer L. Brown & Katharine D. Drake & Melissa A. Martin, 2016. "Compensation in the Post†FIN 48 Period: The Case of Contracting on Tax Performance and Uncertainty," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 33(1), pages 121-151, March.
    33. Haubrich, Joseph G, 1994. "Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 258-276, April.
    34. Henry L. Tosi & Thomas Greckhamer, 2004. "Culture and CEO Compensation," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 15(6), pages 657-670, December.
    35. Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, 1981. "Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 605-617, Autumn.
    36. Anil Shivdasani & David Yermack, 1999. "CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(5), pages 1829-1853, October.
    37. Barton, Jan & Mercer, Molly, 2005. "To blame or not to blame: Analysts' reactions to external explanations for poor financial performance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 509-533, September.
    38. Choe, Chongwoo & Tian, Gloria Y. & Yin, Xiangkang, 2014. "CEO power and the structure of CEO pay," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 237-248.
    39. Jiahua Xu & Lan Zou, 2019. "The impact of CEO pay and its disclosure on stock price crash risk: evidence from China," China Finance Review International, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 9(4), pages 479-497, July.
    40. Otto, Clemens A., 2014. "CEO optimism and incentive compensation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 366-404.
    41. Gormley, Todd A. & Matsa, David A. & Milbourn, Todd, 2013. "CEO compensation and corporate risk: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 79-101.
    42. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 71-92, Summer.
    43. Francis, Bill B. & Hasan, Iftekhar & John, Kose & Waisman, Maya, 2016. "Urban Agglomeration and CEO Compensation," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(6), pages 1925-1953, December.
    44. Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, 2008. "All That Glitters: The Effect of Attention and News on the Buying Behavior of Individual and Institutional Investors," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(2), pages 785-818, April.
    45. Mun, Seongjae & Han, Seung Hun & Kim, Hyeong Joon, 2021. "Terrorist attacks and total factor productivity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
    46. Joseph E. Engelberg & Christopher A. Parsons, 2011. "The Causal Impact of Media in Financial Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(1), pages 67-97, February.
    47. Brück, Tilman & Llussá, Fernanda & Tavares, José A., 2011. "Entrepreneurship: The role of extreme events," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(S1), pages 78-88.
    48. Clemens A. Otto, 2014. "CEO optimism and incentive compensation," Post-Print hal-01097589, HAL.
    49. Lambert, Ra & Larcker, Df & Verrecchia, Re, 1991. "Portfolio Considerations In Valuing Executive-Compensation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 129-149.
    50. Douglas W. Diamond, 1991. "Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(3), pages 709-737.
    51. Hongbin Huang & Yani Sun & Qingling Chu, 2021. "Can we-media information disclosure drive listed companies' innovation?—From the perspective of financing constraints," China Finance Review International, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 12(3), pages 477-495, April.
    52. Katsuyuki Kubo, 2005. "Executive Compensation Policy and Company Performance in Japan," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 429-436, May.
    53. Garen, John E, 1994. "Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(6), pages 1175-1199, December.
    54. Focke, Florens & Maug, Ernst & Niessen-Ruenzi, Alexandra, 2017. "The impact of firm prestige on executive compensation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 313-336.
    55. Smith, Clifford W. & Stulz, René M., 1985. "The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(4), pages 391-405, December.
    56. Henry He Huang & Joseph Kerstein & Chong Wang, 2018. "The impact of climate risk on firm performance and financing choices: An international comparison," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 49(5), pages 633-656, July.
    57. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Fried, Jesse M., 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt81q3136r, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    58. Deng, Xin & Gao, Huasheng, 2013. "Nonmonetary Benefits, Quality of Life, and Executive Compensation," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(1), pages 197-218, February.
    59. Michael R Czinkota & Gary Knight & Peter W Liesch & John Steen, 2010. "Terrorism and international business: A research agenda," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 41(5), pages 826-843, June.
    60. Chen, Jie & Goergen, Marc & Leung, Woon Sau & Song, Wei, 2019. "CEO and director compensation, CEO turnover and institutional investors: Is there cronyism in the UK?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 18-35.
    61. Mathew L. A. Hayward & Violina P. Rindova & Timothy G. Pollock, 2004. "Believing one's own press: the causes and consequences of CEO celebrity," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(7), pages 637-653, July.
    62. Dai, Yunhao & Rau, P. Raghavendra & Stouraitis, Aris & Tan, Weiqiang, 2020. "An ill wind? Terrorist attacks and CEO compensation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(2), pages 379-398.
    63. Cheng, Lulu & Xie, En & Fang, Junyi & Mei, Nan, 2022. "Performance feedback and firms’ relative strategic emphasis: The moderating effects of board independence and media coverage," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 218-231.
    64. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1979. "Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 231-259, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dai, Yunhao & Rau, P. Raghavendra & Stouraitis, Aris & Tan, Weiqiang, 2020. "An ill wind? Terrorist attacks and CEO compensation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(2), pages 379-398.
    2. Wolfgang Drobetz & Pascal Pensa & Markus M. Schmid, 2007. "Estimating the Cost of Executive Stock Options: evidence from Switzerland," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 798-815, September.
    3. Ulrike Malmendier, 2018. "Behavioral Corporate Finance," NBER Working Papers 25162, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Anne Amar-Sabbah & Pierre Batteau, 2018. "CEO Compensation: Agency Theory is Irrelevant but not the Neoclassical Game-Theoretic Framework," Working Papers halshs-01818600, HAL.
    5. Focke, Florens & Maug, Ernst & Niessen-Ruenzi, Alexandra, 2017. "The impact of firm prestige on executive compensation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 313-336.
    6. Ann-Christine Schulz & Miriam Flickinger, 2020. "Does CEO (over)compensation influence corporate reputation?," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 903-927, August.
    7. Tung Nguyen & Dimitris Petmezas & Nikolaos Karampatsas, 2023. "Does Terrorism Affect Acquisitions?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(7), pages 4134-4168, July.
    8. Yaowen Shan & Terry Walter, 2016. "Towards a Set of Design Principles for Executive Compensation Contracts," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 52(4), pages 619-684, December.
    9. Ingolf Dittmann & Ernst Maug, 2007. "Lower Salaries and No Options? On the Optimal Structure of Executive Pay," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(1), pages 303-343, February.
    10. Kim, Hyeong Joon & Han, Seung Hun & Mun, Seongjae, 2022. "Analyzing the effects of terrorist attacks on the value of cash holdings," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 45(C).
    11. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
    12. Christian Engelen, 2015. "The effects of managerial discretion on moral hazard related behaviour: German evidence on agency costs," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 19(4), pages 927-960, November.
    13. Robert M. Gillenkirch & Achim Hendriks & Susanne A. Welker, 2014. "Effects of Executive Compensation Complexity on Investor Behaviour in an Experimental Stock Market," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(4), pages 625-645, December.
    14. Dang, Tung Lam & Dang, Viet Anh & Moshirian, Fariborz & Nguyen, Lily & Zhang, Bohui, 2019. "News media coverage and corporate leverage adjustments," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    15. Hwang, Yunji & Hun Han, Seung, 2022. "Terrorist attacks, CEO overconfidence, and CEO compensation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(PA).
    16. Chen, Jie & Song, Wei & Goergen, Marc, 2019. "Passing the dividend baton: The impact of dividend policy on new CEOs' initial compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 458-481.
    17. Bang Dang Nguyen, 2015. "Is More News Good News? Media Coverage of CEOs, Firm Value, and Rent Extraction," Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(04), pages 1-38, December.
    18. Merz, Alexander, 2017. "What have we learned from SFAS 123r and IFRS 2? A review of existing evidence and future research suggestions," Journal of Accounting Literature, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 14-33.
    19. Blankespoor, Elizabeth & deHaan, Ed & Marinovic, Iván, 2020. "Disclosure processing costs, investors’ information choice, and equity market outcomes: A review," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2).
    20. Page, T. Beau, 2018. "CEO attributes, compensation, and firm value: Evidence from a structural estimation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(2), pages 378-401.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Terrorist attack; CEO compensation; Rank-and-file employee compensation; Media coverage; CEO bargaining power;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:64:y:2023:i:c:s0275531922002471. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ribaf .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.