IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/moneco/v112y2020icp113-128.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The safe asset, banking equilibrium, and optimal central bank monetary, prudential and balance-sheet policies

Author

Listed:
  • Magill, Michael
  • Quinzii, Martine
  • Rochet, Jean-Charles

Abstract

A simple equilibrium model is presented which permits the joint study of optimal Central Bank prudential, monetary and balance sheet policies in the pre and post 2008 Crisis periods. It explains the new policies—the purchase of risky securities (QE), payment of interest on reserves (IR) and use of reverse repo (RRP)—as the response to the lack of safe assets in the economy, and shows why these policies were not needed to achieve optimality before 2008, but were needed for the 2008 Crisis and thereafter.

Suggested Citation

  • Magill, Michael & Quinzii, Martine & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2020. "The safe asset, banking equilibrium, and optimal central bank monetary, prudential and balance-sheet policies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 113-128.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:112:y:2020:i:c:p:113-128
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2019.02.002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304393219300418
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2019.02.002?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 2013. "A Model of Shadow Banking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(4), pages 1331-1363, August.
    2. Reis, Ricardo, 2016. "Funding quantitative easing to target inflation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67883, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Jeremy C. Stein, 2012. "Monetary Policy as Financial Stability Regulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(1), pages 57-95.
    4. Tim Landvoigt & Juliane Begenau, 2016. "Financial Regulation in a Quantitative Model of the Modern Banking System," 2016 Meeting Papers 1462, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Gorton, Gary B., 2012. "Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don't See Them Coming," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199922901, Decembrie.
    6. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    7. Charles A.E. Goodhart & Anil K. Kashyap & Dimitrios P. Tsomocos & Alexandros P. Vardoulakis, 2019. "Financial Regulation In General Equilibrium," Chapters, in: Financial Regulation and Stability, chapter 3, pages 27-77, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    8. Robert E. Hall & Ricardo Reis, 2015. "Maintaining Central-Bank Financial Stability under New-Style Central Banking," NBER Working Papers 21173, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Gorton, Gary & Metrick, Andrew, 2012. "Securitized banking and the run on repo," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(3), pages 425-451.
    10. Robert E. Hall & Ricardo Reis, 2016. "Achieving Price Stability by Manipulating the Central Bank’s Payment on Reserves," NBER Working Papers 22761, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Lawrence Christiano & Daisuke Ikeda, 2014. "Leverage Restrictions in a Business Cycle Model," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Sofía Bauducco & Lawrence Christiano & Claudio Raddatz (ed.),Macroeconomic and Financial Stability: challenges for Monetary Policy, edition 1, volume 19, chapter 7, pages 215-216, Central Bank of Chile.
    12. Gary Gorton & Stefan Lewellen & Andrew Metrick, 2012. "The Safe-Asset Share," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 101-106, May.
    13. Goodhart, Charles & Kashyap, Anil & Tsomocos, Dimitri & Vardoulakis, Alexandros, 2012. "Financial regulation in general equilibrium," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119051, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    14. Gorton, Gary B., 2010. "Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199734153, Decembrie.
    15. Samuel G. Hanson & Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, 2011. "A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(1), pages 3-28, Winter.
    16. Ricardo Reis, 2015. "Different Types of Central Bank Insolvency and the Central Role of Seignorage," NBER Working Papers 21226, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Anat Admati & Martin Hellwig, 2013. "The Bankers' New Clothes: What's Wrong with Banking and What to Do about It," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9929.
    18. Charles A. E. Goodhart & Anil K Kashyap & Dimitrios P. Tsomocos & Alexandros P. Vardoulakis, 2013. "An Integrated Framework for Analyzing Multiple Financial Regulations," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 9(1), pages 109-144, January.
    19. Gertler, Mark & Karadi, Peter, 2011. "A model of unconventional monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 17-34, January.
    20. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, 2010. "Regulating the Shadow Banking System," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 41(2 (Fall)), pages 261-312.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Daniel Covitz & Nellie Liang & Tobias Adrian, 2015. "Financial Stability Monitoring," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 7(1), pages 357-395, December.
    2. Stijn Claessens & M Ayhan Kose, 2018. "Frontiers of macrofinancial linkages," BIS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 95.
    3. Luck, Stephan & Schempp, Paul, 2014. "Banks, shadow banking, and fragility," Working Paper Series 1726, European Central Bank.
    4. Financial Stability Committee, Task Force on cross-border Spillover Effects of macroprudential measures & Kok, Christoffer & Reinhardt, Dennis, 2020. "Cross-border spillover effects of macroprudential policies: a conceptual framework," Occasional Paper Series 242, European Central Bank.
    5. Matthieu Darracq Paries, 2018. "Financial frictions and monetary policy conduct," Erudite Ph.D Dissertations, Erudite, number ph18-01 edited by Ferhat Mihoubi, December.
    6. DeAngelo, Harry & Stulz, Rene M., 2013. "Why High Leverage Is Optimal for Banks," Working Paper Series 2013-08, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
    7. Bouwman, Christa H. S., 2013. "Liquidity: How Banks Create It and How It Should Be Regulated," Working Papers 13-32, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
    8. Thomas Philippon, 2015. "Has the US Finance Industry Become Less Efficient? On the Theory and Measurement of Financial Intermediation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(4), pages 1408-1438, April.
    9. DeAngelo, Harry & Stulz, René M., 2015. "Liquid-claim production, risk management, and bank capital structure: Why high leverage is optimal for banks," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 219-236.
    10. Juliane M. Begenau, 2015. "Capital Requirements, Risk Choice, and Liquidity Provision in a Business Cycle Model," Harvard Business School Working Papers 15-072, Harvard Business School, revised Sep 2016.
    11. Federico Lubello & Abdelaziz Rouabah, 2017. "Capturing macroprudential regulation effectiveness: A DSGE approach with shadow intermediaries," BCL working papers 114, Central Bank of Luxembourg.
    12. Ebrahimi Kahou, Mahdi & Lehar, Alfred, 2017. "Macroprudential policy: A review," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 92-105.
    13. Liu, Keqing, 2016. "Bank equity and macroprudential policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 1-17.
    14. Krishnamurthy, Arvind & Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette, 2015. "The impact of Treasury supply on financial sector lending and stability," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(3), pages 571-600.
    15. Laurent Clerc & Alexis Derviz & Caterina Mendicino & Stephane Moyen & Kalin Nikolov & Livio Stracca & Javier Suarez & Alexandros P. Vardoulakis, 2015. "Capital Regulation in a Macroeconomic Model with Three Layers of Default," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 11(3), pages 9-63, June.
    16. Emmanuel Farhi & Jean Tirole, 2021. "Shadow Banking and the Four Pillars of Traditional Financial Intermediation [Securitization without Risk Transfer]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(6), pages 2622-2653.
    17. Juliane Begenau, 2015. "Capital Requirements, Risk Choice, and Liquidity Provision in a Business Cycle Model," 2015 Meeting Papers 687, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    18. Ari, Anil & Darracq Pariès, Matthieu & Kok, Christoffer & Żochowski, Dawid, 2016. "When shadows grow longer: shadow banking with endogenous entry," Working Paper Series 1943, European Central Bank.
    19. Aikman, David & Kiley, Michael & Lee, Seung Jung & Palumbo, Michael G. & Warusawitharana, Missaka, 2017. "Mapping heat in the U.S. financial system," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 36-64.
    20. Ippolito, Filippo & Peydró, José-Luis & Polo, Andrea & Sette, Enrico, 2016. "Double bank runs and liquidity risk management," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(1), pages 135-154.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banking equilibrium; Capital requirements; Prudential policy; Monetary policy; Balance sheet policy; Quantitative easing; Interest on reserves;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D - Microeconomics
    • D - Microeconomics
    • E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
    • G - Financial Economics
    • G - Financial Economics

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:112:y:2020:i:c:p:113-128. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505566 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.