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Effects of exclusion on acceptance in ultimatum games

  • Fischer, Sven
  • Güth, Werner
Registered author(s):

    In three-party ultimatum games, the proposer can first decide whether to exclude one responder, which increases the available pie. The experiments control for intentionality of exclusion and veto power of the third party. We do not find evidence for indirect reciprocity of the remaining responder after exclusion of the other. Similarly, not excluding the second responder is only insignificantly reciprocated by him. Overall, we find little evidence that intentional exclusion affects responder behavior.

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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487012000864
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Psychology.

    Volume (Year): 33 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 6 ()
    Pages: 1100-1114

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:33:y:2012:i:6:p:1100-1114
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/joep

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