IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/halshs-00144851.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Ostracism in Work Teams: A Public Good Experiment

Author

Listed:
  • David Masclet

    () (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper provides an experimental examination of the effects of ostracism on cooperation. Ostracism is one of the most radical forms of peer pressure. More generally, ostracism is the exclusion of disapproved individuals from interaction with a social group. By performing a laboratory experiment involving a public good game with exclusion, the paper provides empirical evidence that threats of exclusion increase contributions. The results show that subjects exclude their peers for two reasons. Subjects are willing to punish unfair behaviors (non-strategic reason) and expect changes in behavior in response to exclusions (strategic reason).
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • David Masclet, 2003. "Ostracism in Work Teams: A Public Good Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00144851, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00144851
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00144851
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Abhijit Ramalingam & Brock V. Stoddard & James M. Walker, 2016. "The market for talent: Competition for resources and self governane in teams," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 16-15, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    2. Marie Claire Villeval, 2017. "Exclusion and reintegration in a social dilemna," Post-Print halshs-01662829, HAL.
    3. Maier-Rigaud, Frank P. & Martinsson, Peter & Staffiero, Gianandrea, 2010. "Ostracism and the provision of a public good: experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 387-395, March.
    4. repec:eee:eecrev:v:103:y:2018:i:c:p:125-149 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Dirk Engelmann & Nikos Nikiforakis, 2015. "In the long-run we are all dead: on the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(3), pages 561-577, October.
    6. Jan T.R. Stoop & Daan P. van Soest & Jana Vyrastekova, 2013. "A tale of two carrots: the effectiveness of multiple reward stages in a common pool resource game," Chapters,in: Handbook on Experimental Economics and the Environment, chapter 10, pages 291-318 Edward Elgar Publishing.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public good ostracism experiment;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00144851. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.