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Effects of exclusion on social preferences

Listed author(s):
  • Sven Fischer

    ()

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)

  • Werner Güth

    ()

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group)

In three party ultimatum games the proposer can first decide whether to exclude one responder, what increases the available pie. The experiments control for intentionality of exclusion and veto power of the third party. We do not find evidence for indirect reciprocity of the remaining responder after the exclusion of the other. Similarly, not excluding the second responder is only insignificantly reciprocated by it. Overall, we find little evidence that intentional exclusion has substantial effects on behavior.

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File URL: http://pubdb.wiwi.uni-jena.de/pdf/wp_2011_053.pdf
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Paper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2011-053.

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Date of creation: 07 Nov 2011
Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-053
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