IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Efficiency Principle in Non-Cooperative Coalitional Bargaining


  • Akira Okada


No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Akira Okada, 2000. "The Efficiency Principle in Non-Cooperative Coalitional Bargaining," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 51(1), pages 34-50, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:51:y:2000:i:1:p:34-50

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Clemhout, Simone & Wan, Henry Jr., 1994. "Differential games -- Economic applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 23, pages 801-825 Elsevier.
    2. Takayama,Akira, 1985. "Mathematical Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521314985, March.
    3. Van Long, Ngo & Shimomura, Koji, 1998. "Some results on the Markov equilibria of a class of homogeneous differential games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(3-4), pages 557-566, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Roy Chowdhury, Prabal & Sengupta, Kunal, 2012. "Transparency, complementarity and holdout," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 598-612.
    2. repec:kap:theord:v:82:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s11238-016-9577-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Bloch, Francis & Gomes, Armando, 2006. "Contracting with externalities and outside options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 172-201, March.
    4. Licun Xue & Lingling Zhang, 2012. "Bidding and sequential coalition formation with externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(1), pages 49-73, February.
    5. Harold Houba & Gerard Laan & Yuyu Zeng, 2015. "International Environmental Agreements for River Sharing Problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 855-872, December.
    6. Akira Okada, 2014. "The stationary equilibrium of three-person coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: a classification," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(4), pages 953-973, November.
    7. Akira Okada, 2015. "Cooperation and Institution in Games," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 66(1), pages 1-32, March.
    8. repec:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-016-0527-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Prabal Roy Chowdhury & Kunal Sengupta, 2008. "Multi-person bargaining with complementarity: Is there holdout?," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 08-10, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
    10. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 2015. "Coalition Formation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
    11. Fumi Kiyotaki & Toshiji Miyakawa, 2013. "Barriers to Global Free Trade through Bilateral Agreements," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(3), pages 536-548, August.

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:51:y:2000:i:1:p:34-50. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.