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Proposer and responder conceding in impunity bargaining

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  • Daniela Di Cagno
  • Werner Güth
  • Luca Panaccione
  • Maria Cristina Scarafile

Abstract

In impunity bargaining with concession, opportunistic proposers would not offer anything nor concede. Opportunistic responders should not accept first offers since second offers could be more generous, for example, due to random trembles. On the contrary, our experimental data, elicited via the strategy vector method, show that participants moderate initial claims and concede, albeit by small amounts. The considerable heterogeneity in behavior suggests that disagreement is unpleasant: participants avoid it by yielding (demanding firstly less than what can be shared) and conceding (lowering first demand). Overall agreement dominates interpersonally (one plays against another) and intrapersonally (as if one plays against oneself).

Suggested Citation

  • Daniela Di Cagno & Werner Güth & Luca Panaccione & Maria Cristina Scarafile, 2023. "Proposer and responder conceding in impunity bargaining," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(4), pages 722-747, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:metroe:v:74:y:2023:i:4:p:722-747
    DOI: 10.1111/meca.12437
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