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Agency costs, institutions, learning, and taxation in venture capital contracting

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  • Cumming, Douglas J.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Business Venturing.

Volume (Year): 20 (2005)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
Pages: 573-622

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jbvent:v:20:y:2005:i:5:p:573-622
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbusvent

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  3. Christian Keuschnigg & Søren Bo Nielsen, 2004. "Progressive Taxation, Moral Hazard, and Entrepreneurship," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 6(3), pages 471-490, 08.
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  5. Philippe Desbrières & Sophie Manigart & Koen De Waele & Mike Wright & Ken Robbie & Harry Sapienza & Amy Beekman, 2002. "Determinants of required return in venture capital investments:A five country study," Working Papers CREGO 1020701, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  6. Brennan, Michael J & Kraus, Alan, 1987. " Efficient Financing under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 42(5), pages 1225-1243, December.
  7. Keuschnigg, Christian & Nielsen, Soren Bo, 2002. "Start-ups, Venture Capitalists and the Capital Gains Tax," CEPR Discussion Papers 3263, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Mike Wright & Robert E. Hoskisson & Lowell W. Busenitz & Jay Dial, 2001. "Finance and management buyouts: Agency versus entrepreneurship perspectives," Venture Capital, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(3), pages 239-261, July.
  9. Schmidt, Klaus M., 1999. "Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2317, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Cumming, Douglas J. & MacIntosh, Jeffrey G., 2003. "A cross-country comparison of full and partial venture capital exits," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 511-548, March.
  11. Blanchard, Olivier Jean & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 1994. "What do firms do with cash windfalls?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 337-360, December.
  12. Ulrich Hege & Dirk Bergemann, 1998. "Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and learning," Post-Print hal-00481696, HAL.
  13. Philippe Desbrières & Sophie Manigart & Koen De Waele & Mike Wright & Ken Robbie & Harry Sapienza & Amy Beekman, 1999. "Venture capitalists, investment appraisal and accounting information: a comparative study of the US, UK, France, Belgium and Holland," Working Papers CREGO 0991102, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  14. Josh Lerner, 2002. "When Bureaucrats Meet Entrepreneurs: The Design of Effective "Public Venture Capital" Programmes," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(477), pages 73-84, February.
  15. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
  16. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
  17. Leslie M. Marx, 1998. "Efficient venture capital financing combining debt and equity," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 3(4), pages 371-387.
  18. Vesa Kanniainen & Christian Keuschnigg, 2001. "Start-Up Investment with Scarce Venture Capital Support," CESifo Working Paper Series 439, CESifo Group Munich.
  19. Trester, Jeffrey J., 1998. "Venture capital contracting under asymmetric information," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 675-699, August.
  20. Mike Wright & Andy Lockett, 2003. "The Structure and Management of Alliances: Syndication in the Venture Capital Industry," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(8), pages 2073-2102, December.
  21. Amit, Raphael & Brander, James & Zott, Christoph, 1998. "Why do venture capital firms exist? theory and canadian evidence," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 13(6), pages 441-466, November.
  22. Christian Keuschnigg & Soren Nielsen, 2001. "Public Policy for Venture Capital," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 8(4), pages 557-572, August.
  23. Bascha, Andreas & Walz, Uwe, 2001. "Convertible securities and optimal exit decisions in venture capital finance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 285-306, September.
  24. Rajan, Raghuram G, 1992. " Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1367-1400, September.
  25. Sapienza, Harry J. & Manigart, Sophie & Vermeir, Wim, 1996. "Venture capitalist governance and value added in four countries," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 11(6), pages 439-469, November.
  26. Vesa Kanniainen & Christian Keuschnigg, 2000. "The Optimal Portfolio of Start-Up Firms in Venture Capital Finance," CESifo Working Paper Series 381, CESifo Group Munich.
  27. Jean-Etienne de Bettignies, 2008. "Financing the Entrepreneurial Venture," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(1), pages 151-166, January.
  28. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  29. Mayer, Colin & Schoors, Koen & Yafeh, Yishay, 2001. "Sources of Funds and Investment Strategies of Venture Capital Funds: Evidence from Germany, Israel, Japan and the UK," CEI Working Paper Series 2001-24, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  30. Green, Richard C., 1984. "Investment incentives, debt, and warrants," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 115-136, March.
  31. Cumming, Douglas & Schmidt, Daniel & Walz, Uwe, 2004. "Legality and venture governance around the world," CFS Working Paper Series 2004/17, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  32. Sophie Manigart & Andy Lockett & Miguel Meuleman & Mike Wright & Hans Landstrm & Hans Bruining & Philippe Desbrieres & Ulrich Hommel, 2002. "Why do European Venture Capital Companies syndicate?," Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School Working Paper Series 2002-20, Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School.
  33. Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, 1992. "An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(3), pages 473-494.
  34. Lockett, Andy & Wright, Mike, 2001. "The syndication of venture capital investments," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 375-390, October.
  35. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1991. " The Theory of Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(1), pages 297-355, March.
  36. Noe, Thomas H & Rebello, Michael J, 1996. " Asymmetric Information, Managerial Opportunism, Financing, and Payout Policies," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(2), pages 637-660, June.
  37. Sahlman, William A., 1990. "The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 473-521, October.
  38. Christian Keuschnigg & Soren Bo Nielsen, 2003. "Taxes and Venture Capital Support," Review of Finance, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 515-539.
  39. Manigart, S. & Bruining, J. & Lockett, A. & Meuleman, M., 2002. "Why Do European Venture Capital Companies Syndicate?," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2002-98-ORG, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
  40. Gompers, Paul A, 1995. " Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1461-1489, December.
  41. Joshua Lerner, 1994. "The Syndication of Venture Capital Investments," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 23(3), Fall.
  42. Sapienza, Harry J., 1992. "When do venture capitalists add value?," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 9-27, January.
  43. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1994. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 841-879.
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