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Impact de la syndication sur la performance des entreprises financées par capital-investissement et sur la richesse des parties prenantes

Listed author(s):
  • Amina Hamdouni

    ()

    (Department of Finance and Investment - Al-Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University)

Registered author(s):

    In this study, we show the importance of the syndication as a specific mechanism of governance. Through this mechanism, private equity takes an active role in the development of the investee firm and has a disciplinary role. By syndication, venture capitalists have direct control. The sample covers the period 2000-March 2009 and consists of 106 VC backed IPOs. We study the impact of VC backing on corporate governance and more precisely the impact of syndication on performance and stakeholders' wealth. The empirical validation shows that syndication hasn't an influence on performance and on VC' wealth.

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    Date of creation: 10 May 2011
    Publication status: Published in Comptabilités, économie et société, May 2011, Montpellier, France. pp.cd-rom, 2011
    Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00650456
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00650456
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