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Taxes and Venture Capital Support

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  • Christian Keuschnigg
  • Søren Bo Nielsen

Abstract

In this paper we set up a model of start-up finance under double moral hazard. Entrepreneurs lack own resources and business experience to develop their ideas. Venture capitalists can provide start-up finance and commercial support. The effort put forth by either agent contributes to the firm’s success, but is not verifiable. As a result, the market equilibrium is biased towards ine.ciently low venture capital support. The capital gains tax becomes especially harmful, as it further impairs advice and causes a first-order welfare loss. Once the capital gains tax is in place, limitations on loss offset may paradoxically contribute to higher quality of venture capital finance and welfare. Subsidies to physical investment in VC-backed startups are detrimental in our framework.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Keuschnigg & Søren Bo Nielsen, 2003. "Taxes and Venture Capital Support," CESifo Working Paper Series 1094, CESifo Group Munich.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1094
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    venture capital; capital gains taxation; double moral hazard;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies

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