Taxation of a venture capitalist with a portfolio of firms
Venture capitalists not only finance but also advise and thereby add value to young entrepreneurial firms. The prospects of venture capital backed firms thus depend on joint efforts of entrepreneurs and informed venture capitalists, and are subject to double moral hazard. For this reason, managerial support and the number of portfolio companies tend to be inefficiently low. This paper investigates how tax policy can possibly contribute to a more active style of venture capital investments. An optimal tax policy is derived that moves the private equilibrium towards a first best allocation. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 56 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://oep.oupjournals.org/Email:
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:56:y:2004:i:2:p:285-306. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.