Efficient venture capital financing combining debt and equity
I present a model of venture capital contracting in which contracts that involve a mixture of both debt and equity are efficient and dominate pure-equity and pure-debt financing. The optimal contract balances the venture capitalist's incentive to intervene in the project and the entrepreneur's desire for control.
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Volume (Year): 3 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
|Note:||Received: 9 September 1997 / Accepted: 3 April 1998|
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