IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Can minority state ownership influence firm value? Universal and contingency views of its governance effects


  • Wu, Hsueh-Liang


Drawing on the literature of corporate governance and privatization, this study explores the elusive roles of a specific owner identity, namely, state ownership in its minority. With a sample of 68 Taiwanese companies with 5 to 49% state ownership during 1999-2003, the study examines the value-shaping effects of minority state ownership (MSO) and, furthermore, seeks to establish a contingency perspective suggesting that the internal and external contexts may moderate the influence of MSO on firm value. Using first-order autoregressive models to mitigate the problems of endogeneity, the study shows that the governance effect of MSO associates not only in a curvilinear relationship with firm value but also strengthened by corporate ownership ties and market competition. The non-monotonic performance effect and the context-dependent nature of MSO yield significant implications for government investments in the private sector.

Suggested Citation

  • Wu, Hsueh-Liang, 2011. "Can minority state ownership influence firm value? Universal and contingency views of its governance effects," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 64(8), pages 839-845, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:64:y:2011:i:8:p:839-845

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Nalebuff, Barry J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1983. "Information, Competition, and Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 278-283, May.
    2. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 678-689, May.
    3. Michael C. Jensen, 2010. "The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 22(1), pages 43-58.
    4. Januszewski, Silke I. & Koke, Jens & Winter, Joachim K., 2002. "Product market competition, corporate governance and firm performance: an empirical analysis for Germany," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 299-332, September.
    5. repec:hrv:faseco:30728046 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    7. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-1161.
    8. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    9. Lins, Karl V., 2003. "Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(01), pages 159-184, March.
    10. Anderson, James H & Lee, Young & Murrell, Peter, 2000. "Competition and Privatization Amidst Weak Institutions: Evidence from Mongolia," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(4), pages 527-549, October.
    11. Denis, Diane K. & McConnell, John J., 2003. "International Corporate Governance," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(01), pages 1-36, March.
    12. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, April.
    13. Jeffry M. Netter & William L. Megginson, 2001. "From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 321-389, June.
    14. Stijn Claessens & Simeon Djankov & Joseph P. H. Fan & Larry H. P. Lang, 2002. "Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(6), pages 2741-2771, December.
    15. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    16. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, January.
    17. Julan Du & Yi Dai, 2005. "Ultimate Corporate Ownership Structures and Capital Structures: evidence from East Asian economies," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(1), pages 60-71, January.
    18. John Vickers & George Yarrow, 1991. "Economic Perspectives on Privatization," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 111-132, Spring.
    19. Nickell, Stephen & Nicolitsas, Daphne, 1997. "Wages, restrictive practices and productivity," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 201-221, September.
    20. repec:hrv:faseco:30747162 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Khan, Raihan & Dharwadkar, Ravi & Brandes, Pamela, 2005. "Institutional ownership and CEO compensation: a longitudinal examination," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 58(8), pages 1078-1088, August.
    22. Gugler, Klaus & Yurtoglu, B. Burcin, 2003. "Corporate governance and dividend pay-out policy in Germany," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 731-758, August.
    23. Bennett, John & Maw, James, 2003. "Privatization, partial state ownership, and competition," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 58-74, March.
    24. repec:lmu:muenar:19529 is not listed on IDEAS
    25. Denis, Diane K., 2001. "Twenty-five years of corporate governance research ... and counting," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 191-212.
    26. Ha-Joon Chang & Ajit Singh, 1997. "POLICY ARENA: Can Large Firms Be Run Efficiently Without Being Bureaucratic?," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(6), pages 865-875.
    27. Kester, W Carl, 1992. "Industrial Groups as Systems of Contractual Governance," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(3), pages 24-44, Autumn.
    28. Sanghoon Ahn, 2002. "Competition, Innovation and Productivity Growth: A Review of Theory and Evidence," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 317, OECD Publishing.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Tang, Tanya (Ya) & Fisher, Gregory J. & Qualls, William, 2016. "Interfirm alliance configuration as a strategy to reduce shareholder risks," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 1199-1207.
    2. Baños-Caballero, Sonia & García-Teruel, Pedro J. & Martínez-Solano, Pedro, 2014. "Working capital management, corporate performance, and financial constraints," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 332-338.
    3. Carney, Richard W. & Liu, Wai-Man (Raymond) & Ngo, Phong T. H., 2012. "Responding to Financial Crisis: The Rise of State Ownership and Implications for Firm Performance," MPRA Paper 43600, University Library of Munich, Germany.


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:64:y:2011:i:8:p:839-845. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.